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THE ELECTION PERIOD AND REGULATION OF THE
DEMOCRATIC PROCESS

Saul Zipkin*

In the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002, Congress introduced regulation
of “electioneering communications”—broadcast communications that name a candidate, target the relevant electorate, and air within a specified time before an election.
In doing so, Congress shaped an election period, a temporal zone preceding the election
in which the government would have enhanced authority to regulate the democratic
process. While upheld on a facial challenge in 2003, the electioneering communications framework was effectively struck down as applied to restrictions on corporate
political advocacy by the Supreme Court in 2007. Taking stock of these developments,
this Article presents a detailed consideration of the election period model and its
treatment by the Court.
A survey of election law reveals a divide: current doctrine generally treats the
vote as so important that the government must regulate it, and political speech as so
important that the government cannot regulate it. These commitments clash in the
context of political speech surrounding the election. I develop the election period concept as a means of approaching this tension and challenge the Court’s emphasis on
the vote itself in validating regulation, advancing a model of the election period as not
only the time in which voters make electoral choices, but also as the primary setting
in which the representative relationship is constructed through the interaction between
candidates and the people that surrounds the election. I argue that the election period
model articulates a regulatory framework that blurs the sharp distinction between
the domains of politics and elections and better recognizes the interest in protecting
the representative process as well as the vote. In doing so, the Article calls attention
to fundamental premises underlying the regulation of campaign finance, assessing
how the structure of campaign finance law coheres with a broader conception of the
democratic process.
* Visiting Assistant Professor of Law, Brooklyn Law School; J.D., Columbia Law
School, 2003; B.A., Yale College, 1997. I am grateful for the support of the Brooklyn Law
School Dean’s Summer Research Stipend Program and the James Milligan Law Review
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participants in the Brooklyn Law School Brown Bag Workshop and the Columbia Law School
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INTRODUCTION
Constitutional doctrine governing campaign finance regulation has long relied
on an array of lines marking permissible and impermissible limitations on political
activity. Most prominently, the Supreme Court has distinguished between contributions and expenditures, generally allowing regulation of the former but not the
latter.1 The doctrine has likewise drawn a line between elections and politics, historically framed by a distinction between “express advocacy” and “issue advocacy.”2
1

See Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976) (upholding contribution limits and striking
down limitations on expenditures).
2
See SAMUEL ISSACHAROFF, PAMELA S. KARLAN & RICHARD H. PILDES, THE LAW OF
DEMOCRACY: LEGAL STRUCTURE OF THE POLITICAL PROCESS 398–99 (3d ed. 2007) (explaining
that “[a]ny regulation of campaign-related spending must confront the need to define a boundary between campaigns (the ‘electoral domain’) and more general public debate over issues,
ideas, and policies (the ‘domain of public discourse’)”); Richard Briffault, Issue Advocacy:
Redrawing the Elections/Politics Line, 77 TEX. L. REV. 1751, 1753 (1999) (noting that “[t]he
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In distinguishing communications that expressly advocate or oppose the election of
a particular candidate from those that do not expressly do so, the express advocacy
line focuses regulation on activities indisputably within the electoral process and bars
restrictions that threaten to intrude on the broader realm of politics.
In light of the varying treatment given the right to vote and the right to free
speech, the government is given broad authority to regulate elections and little deference to regulate speech, especially political speech.3 These commitments to protecting
elections through regulation and protecting speech by limiting regulation sharply
clash in the context of political speech in the election setting. The Court has noted
that “it can hardly be doubted that the constitutional guarantee [of free speech] has its
fullest and most urgent application precisely to the conduct of campaigns for political
office.”4 At the same time, the Court has acknowledged compelling state interests
in preserving values such as the integrity and legitimacy of the democratic process.5
Campaign finance doctrine, and the lines it has drawn, reflects an effort to negotiate
the tensions between these commitments.6
Congress challenged the express advocacy line with the Bipartisan Campaign
Reform Act of 2002 (BCRA),7 prohibiting the use of corporate and union general
treasury funds for “electioneering communications”—broadcast communications that
name a candidate for federal office within sixty days of a general election or thirty
days of a primary and are targeted at the relevant electorate.8 The BCRA scheme
express advocacy/issue advocacy distinction grows out of the need to draw a line between
election campaign spending and general political spending”).
3
See Kathleen M. Sullivan, Against Campaign Finance Reform, 1998 UTAH L. REV. 311,
313 (“We have strong norms of equality in voting, and strong norms of liberty for speech.”);
see also infra Part IV (discussing this point).
4
Monitor Patriot Co. v. Roy, 401 U.S. 265, 272 (1971).
5
See, e.g., McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Comm’n, 514 U.S. 334, 379 (1995) (Scalia, J.,
dissenting) (suggesting that “no justification for regulation is more compelling than protection
of the electoral process”); First Nat’l Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 788–89 (1978)
(“Preserving the integrity of the electoral process, preventing corruption, and ‘sustain[ing]
the active, alert responsibility of the individual citizen in a democracy for the wise conduct of
government’ are interests of the highest importance.” (quoting United States v. UAW-CIO,
352 U.S. 567, 575 (1957))).
6
See Nixon v. Shrink Mo. Gov’t PAC, 528 U.S. 377, 400 (2000) (Breyer, J., concurring)
(noting that in the campaign finance context “constitutionally protected interests lie on both
sides of the legal equation”).
7
While I focus on BCRA’s regulation of corporate- and union-funded ads in the election
period, BCRA does other things as well, most prominently restricting the use of “soft money”:
funds raised by political parties that were not subject to federal campaign finance law. For
discussion of the BCRA provisions, see generally Richard Briffault, McConnell v. FEC and
the Transformation of Campaign Finance Law, 3 ELECTION L.J. 147 (2004); see also Davis
v. FEC, 554 U.S. ___, 128 S. Ct. 2759 (2008) (striking down the “Millionaire’s Amendment”
enacted in BCRA).
8
Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-155, 116 Stat. 81 (2002)
(codified at 2 U.S.C. § 441b(b)(2) (2006) (restricting use of corporate funds for electioneering
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presented a new framework for regulating election advertising, shaping an election
period, a temporal zone preceding the election in which the government would have
enhanced authority to regulate the democratic process.9 This election period model,
familiar from international and other domestic settings,10 and prefigured by commentators before BCRA’s enactment,11 provided an alternative to an express advocacy
line that distinguishes an electoral process confined to the vote from a larger sphere
of politics.

communications) and 2 U.S.C. § 434(f)(3)(A)(i) (2006) (defining “electioneering communications”)). The statute allows corporations and unions to pay for electioneering communications from a separate segregated fund. See infra note 21.
9
See Samuel Issacharoff, Fragile Democracies, 120 HARV. L. REV. 1405, 1458 (2007)
(noting that in passing BCRA, “Congress for the first time introduced the concept of a distinct election period for restrictions on what are termed ‘electioneering communications’”).
Similar provisions enacted in some states have been struck down as overbroad. See, e.g., Vt.
Right to Life Comm., Inc. v. Sorrell, 221 F.3d 376, 389–91 (2d Cir. 2000) (striking down
disclosure requirement for “mass media activities” naming candidate within thirty days of
election); Right to Life of Mich., Inc. v. Miller, 23 F. Supp. 2d 766, 771 (W.D. Mich. 1998)
(striking down a state administrative rule prohibiting corporations and labor unions from
using general treasury funds to pay for communications naming candidate within forty-five
days prior to election); Planned Parenthood Affiliates of Mich., Inc. v. Miller, 21 F. Supp. 2d
740, 746 (E.D. Mich. 1998) (same); W. Virginians for Life, Inc. v. Smith, 960 F. Supp. 1036,
1042 (S.D. W. Va. 1996) (striking down state law establishing a presumption that publication
or distribution of “scorecard, voter guide, or other written analysis” of candidate’s positions
on issues within sixty days of election constitutes electoral advocacy). Courts have upheld
state laws banning contributions in periods preceding elections for the purpose of effectuating public funding schemes. See, e.g., N.C. Right to Life Comm. Fund for Indep. Political
Expenditures v. Leake, 524 F.3d 427, 440–41 (4th Cir. 2008), cert. denied, Duke v. Leake,
129 S. Ct. 490 (2008) (upholding a North Carolina provision banning judicial candidates from
accepting contributions during the twenty-one days preceding a general election when the
candidate’s opponent is participating in the public funding program); Gable v. Patton, 142
F.3d 940, 949–53 (6th Cir. 1998), cert. denied, 525 U.S. 1177 (1999) (upholding a Kentucky
statutory provision prohibiting gubernatorial candidates from accepting contributions during
the twenty-eight days preceding a primary or general election but striking down a restriction
on candidates contributing to their own campaigns during that period).
10
See Samuel Issacharoff, The Constitutional Logic of Campaign Finance Regulation,
36 PEPP. L. REV. 373 (2009) (discussing campaign finance regulations in other democracies);
see also infra Part I.B.
11
See, e.g., C. Edwin Baker, Campaign Expenditures and Free Speech, 33 HARV. C.R.C.L. L. REV. 1 (1998); Briffault, supra note 2; Burt Neuborne, The Supreme Court and Free
Speech: Love and a Question, 42 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 789, 806–11 (1998); see also Dennis F.
Thompson, Election Time: Normative Implications of Temporal Properties of the Electoral
Process in the United States, 98 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 51, 62 (2004) (arguing that “[b]ecause
of their finality, elections and the campaigns leading up to them should be considered more a
part of government than a part of politics that influences government”); infra notes 62–66
and accompanying text.
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The new approach was soon rebuffed. Though upheld by the Supreme Court
on a facial challenge in McConnell v. Federal Election Commission in 2003,12 the
electioneering communications provision was effectively struck down as applied in
Federal Election Commission v. Wisconsin Right to Life, Inc. (WRTL) in 2007.13
The Court there concluded that the restrictions could be applied only to express advocacy and its “functional equivalent,” essentially reinstating the pre-BCRA standard.14
Taking stock of these developments, this Article presents a detailed consideration and
endorsement of the election period model in the campaign finance setting, arguing
against a sharp distinction between politics and elections as a means of protecting
interests in representation as well as the vote.
Because there is broad consensus that the First Amendment demands an unregulated sphere of public discourse and because elections, as regulated settings, have
received distinct constitutional treatment,15 identifying a constitutionally acceptable
regulatory line demands an articulation of the boundaries of the “election.” Does
the electoral sphere include only the actual vote or does it encompass some larger
account of the democratic process? The express advocacy framework provides one
possible border, allowing some regulation of advertisements that solicit the vote:
those that by their content enter the voting process. To one side of that model are
those who would reject any regulation of political speech, except for disclosure requirements or restrictions on speech that may directly interfere with the ballot-casting
process, while BCRA goes the other way, broadening the sphere of the election as
a regulable entity.16 These varying placements of the regulatory line exemplify the
contested borders of the politics and elections domains.
This Article develops an account of the election period as not only the site in
which voters make electoral choices but also as the primary setting in which the representative relationship is constructed through the interaction between the people and
the candidates that surrounds the election. On this account, the election period
12

540 U.S. 93 (2003).
551 U.S. 449 (2007).
14
See id. at 457.
15
This point is developed in Frederick Schauer & Richard H. Pildes, Electoral
Exceptionalism and the First Amendment, 77 TEX. L. REV. 1803 (1999). See Baker, supra
note 11, and Briffault, supra note 2, for discussion of the election as a distinct setting for constitutional purposes. See Frederick Schauer, Principles, Institutions, and the First Amendment, 112
HARV. L. REV. 84 (1998), and Frederick Schauer, Towards an Institutional First Amendment,
89 MINN. L. REV. 1256 (2005), for discussion of the role of institutions in First Amendment
analysis more generally. But see Robert Post, Regulating Election Speech Under the First
Amendment, 77 TEX. L. REV. 1837, 1839 (1999) (arguing that “[w]hat is necessary to make the
[elections as First Amendment institutions] approach convincing . . . is a detailed appraisal
of what constitutionally would be gained, and what lost, by demarcating elections as a separate
domain of First Amendment doctrine”).
16
In this paper, I am not so much interested in the precise placement of the regulatory line
as in the type of regulatory line that is being drawn and the commitments that underlie the
choice of that line.
13

538

WILLIAM & MARY BILL OF RIGHTS JOURNAL

[Vol. 18:533

provides a regulatory line that blurs the sharp distinction between the domains of
politics and elections. In advancing the election period model of regulation, I seek to
challenge the emphasis on the vote itself in validating regulation and to highlight the
interests in protecting the representative process as well.17 In short, I argue that fundamental democratic commitments are present in the pre-election period as well as the
ballot-casting moment, and that where particular forms of regulation are permitted in
the election setting, we should assess their applicability in the election period as well.
We may be at the dawn of a new era of campaign finance doctrine. Shortly before
this Article went to press, the Supreme Court issued its decision in Citizens United v.
Federal Election Commission, dramatically reshaping campaign finance law in overruling the decisions that had allowed for regulation of corporate electoral advocacy.18
In light of these developments, it is all the more important to press our thinking about
what kinds of regulatory lines can be drawn going forward. My goal in this Article
is to explore the institutional framework within which election regulation occurs,
assessing the permissible domain of regulation and the values that underlie those
borders, and calling for a broader vision of the democratic process, attending to both
representation and the vote. By considering the implications of the election period
framework as a case study in regulation of the democratic process, I seek to integrate
our approach to campaign finance regulation into a larger vision of the practice of
American democracy.
The Article proceeds in five parts. Part I sets out the election period model, describing the underlying account of representative democracy and detailing the conception of the election period as a temporal zone preceding the election that affects
both the vote and the shaping of the continuing representative relationship. The
Article then steps back to explore the relationship between politics and elections in the
doctrine governing the regulation of corporate election advertising. I assess in Part II
the development of the express advocacy doctrine and its reemergence in WRTL in the
face of Congress’s attempt to supercede it through BCRA’s electioneering communications regulations. Part III explores the various interests the Court has identified
as viable justifications for election speech regulations, arguing that justifications for
regulation are moving towards premising regulation on protection of the governing
process and representation rather than the electoral process. The tension between the
emphasis on protection of the representative process and the limitation of regulation
to the electoral process speaks to a deeper tension between the treatment of political
17

To be sure, agreeing that we should not subordinate political speech to the vote does not
dictate any view on the legitimacy or desirability of regulation of political advertising. Compare
Robert Post, Meiklejohn’s Mistake: Individual Autonomy and the Reform of Public Discourse,
64 U. COLO. L. REV. 1109 (1993) (arguing against various justifications for regulating political
speech), with NADIA URBINATI, REPRESENTATIVE DEMOCRACY: PRINCIPLES AND GENEALOGY
226 (2006) (arguing that the Supreme Court’s decision in McConnell “is a positive although
timid step in the right direction”).
18
No. 08-205, slip op. (U.S. Sup. Ct. Jan. 21, 2010).
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deliberation and the vote, discussed in Part IV, which develops and evaluates the distinctions between these models. Ultimately, this distinction, which stems from competing conceptions of the deliberative and electoral processes, results in the drawing
of a sharp line between the two domains. I argue that we instead see these as continuous elements of a unitary democratic process, and suggest in Part V that the particular
characteristics of corporate political speech present a context in which an election
period framing can shape a viable approach to structuring the deliberative process. The
conclusion presents some early thoughts on the Citizens United decision in relation
to the discussion here.
I. THE ELECTION PERIOD MODEL
For a number of years the express advocacy rule governed the constitutionality
of corporate political advertising regulation, turning on whether the advertisement
expressly advocated the election or defeat of a particular candidate.19 Congress
restructured this framework in the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002, prohibiting a corporation20 or labor union from using general treasury funds to pay for
an “electioneering communication,”21 defined as
any broadcast, cable, or satellite communication which (i) refers
to a clearly identified candidate for Federal office; (II) is made
within (aa) 60 days before a general, special, or runoff election
for the office sought by the candidate; or (bb) 30 days before a
primary or preference election, or a convention or caucus of a
political party that has authority to nominate a candidate, for the
office sought by the candidate; and (III) in the case of a communication which refers to a candidate other than President or Vice
President, is targeted to the relevant electorate.22
19

See infra Part II (discussing development of express advocacy rule).
The term “corporation” refers, here and throughout unless otherwise specified, to any
entity organized under the corporate form, whether for profit or non-profit, though with an
exception for ideological corporations that meet certain criteria, as discussed infra note 89.
21
2 U.S.C. § 441b(b)(2) (Supp. III 2003). BCRA did not ban corporate or union ads, but
required them to be funded from segregated funds, or “PACs.” As McConnell explained,
“[b]ecause corporations can still fund electioneering communications with PAC money, it is
‘simply wrong’ to view the provision as a ‘complete ban’ on expression rather than a regulation.” McConnell v. FEC, 540 U.S. 93, 204 (2003) (quoting FEC v. Beaumont, 539 U.S.
146, 162 (2003)).
22
2 U.S.C. § 434(f)(3)(A)(i) (Supp. III 2003). BCRA also enacted a backup definition
in the event the primary definition “is held to be constitutionally insufficient by final judicial
decision to support the regulation provided [therein].” § 434(f)(3)(A)(ii). The backup definition
defines “electioneering communication” as
any broadcast, cable, or satellite communication which promotes or
supports a candidate for that office, or attacks or opposes a candidate for
20
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In triggering regulation based on the airing of a corporate-funded, candidate-naming
ad within a specified time preceding the election, this provision constructed an election period, reshaping not only the form of regulation but also the relationship between
political speech and the vote.23 BCRA regulated electioneering communications
through disclosure and disclaimer requirements as well.24
In this Article, I develop the concept of an election period and argue that this
framing bridges a recurring tension between the Court’s treatment of regulations designed to protect the vote and those designed to protect the deliberative process. This
Part lays out the vision of the representative process underlying this approach before
describing the election period model.
A. Representative Democracy and the Vote
This section situates the analysis by describing the conceptions underlying the
model of the representative process relied upon here. My basic premise is that democracy is not reducible to the opportunity to vote every few years, but encompasses a continuing process of representation, characterized by interaction between the citizenry
and its representatives. A minimalist account of democracy focused on regular elections alone has been advanced by some commentators, notably Joseph Schumpeter,25
and has been argued to constitute the dominant vision of the Federalists in the late
eighteenth century.26 In eschewing this model, which leaves citizens out of the
that office (regardless of whether the communication expressly advocates a vote for or against a candidate) and which also is suggestive of
no plausible meaning other than an exhortation to vote for or against a
specific candidate.
Id.
23

Congress apparently did not intend to shape a formal election period. See Bob Bauer,
Looking for the Missing Logic of Campaign Finance Regulation, MORE SOFT MONEY HARD
LAW, Nov. 24, 2008, http://www.moresoftmoneyhardlaw.com/updates/other_related_legal
_developments.html?Archive=1&AID=1377 (noting that the election period “was not really
meant to be a conceptual innovation: in fact, the sponsors of BCRA hastened to insist that
it was not”).
24
The disclosure requirements are triggered when any person spends more than $10,000
in a calendar year for the direct costs of producing electioneering communications. See
§ 434(f)(1); see also § 441d (detailing disclaimer requirements applicable to electioneering
communications).
25
See JOSEPH A. SCHUMPETER, CAPITALISM, SOCIALISM AND DEMOCRACY 295 (1976)
(suggesting that voters “must understand that, once they have elected an individual, political
action is his business and not theirs”).
26
See, e.g., Larry D. Kramer, Lecture, “The Interest of the Man”: James Madison,
Popular Constitutionalism, and the Theory of Deliberative Democracy, 41 VAL. U. L. REV.
697, 713–16 (2006) (discussing Federalists’ views in the 1790s such as Benjamin Rush’s
statement that: “[The people] possess [political power] only on the days of their elections.
After this, it is the property of their rulers, nor can they exercise or resume it, unless it is
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continuing process of governing, I follow scholars who have called for a less exclusive focus on the vote and for greater attention to other modes of political participation and structures of democracy,27 and, correspondingly, those arguing that the right
to participate in the political process should be seen to extend beyond the casting of
the ballot alone.28
I adopt here a model of representative democracy developed by various commentators. Nadia Urbinati has articulated a comprehensive contemporary defense of
representative democracy, emphasizing continuing communication between representatives and constituents as a means of continually recreating the representative
relationship, in opposition to a static view in which the public expresses its views
solely through the vote and remains silent at other times.29 In particular, Professor
Urbinati argues that “political representation is far more than a system of division of
labor and a state institution; it entails a complex political process that activates the
abused”). The Federalist conception is also developed in James P. Martin, When Repression
is Democratic and Constitutional: The Federalist Theory of Representation and the Sedition
Act of 1798, 66 U. CHI. L. REV. 117 (1999). This minimalist account has been argued to have
been developed in seventeenth-century Massachusetts. See J.S. MALOY, THE COLONIAL
AMERICAN ORIGINS OF MODERN DEMOCRATIC THOUGHT 17 (2008) (“John Winthrop invented the proposition that regular elections are sufficient to control the elected precisely in
order to take non-electoral forms of accountability off the table.”).
27
See, e.g., BENJAMIN R. BARBER, STRONG DEMOCRACY: PARTICIPATORY POLITICS FOR
A NEW AGE 136 (1984) (“Where voting is a static act of expressing one’s preference, participation is a dynamic act of imagination that requires participants to change how they see the
world.”); URBINATI, supra note 17, at 14 (arguing that “[e]lections make apathy, not agency,
the main quality of popular sovereignty”); Lani Guinier, Beyond Electocracy: Rethinking the
Political Representative as Powerful Stranger, 71 MOD. L. REV. 1, 3 (2008) (arguing that “[t]he
goals (in terms of its legitimacy, outcomes and process) of representative democracy are not
served when we define citizens’ participation primarily by the capacity of the electorate to
vote” and conceptualizing “alternative forms of citizen mobilization—outside of elections—
that have the potential to remake elections into more effective mechanisms of democratic
accountability”); Post, supra note 15, at 1842 (arguing that “the very predominance of egalitarian thinking in the campaign finance reform literature suggests the extent to which political
speech, which was meant both to inform voting and to endow it with democratic legitimacy,
has become identified with and subordinated to the process of voting itself”).
28
See, e.g., Kathryn Abrams, “Raising Politics Up”: Minority Political Participation and
Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act, 63 N.Y.U. L. REV. 449, 489–92 (1988) (advocating the
application of “a wider lens to the political process” which “would describe the activity that
legitimized governmental power not as a single electoral event, but as a process that began
with reflection on, and discussion of, preferences and concluded with the enactment of substantive policies”); Pamela S. Karlan, The Rights to Vote: Some Pessimism About Formalism, 71
TEX. L. REV. 1705, 1708 (1993) (arguing that the right to vote protects interests in participation,
aggregation, and governance).
29
See URBINATI, supra note 17, at 228 (“Politics keeps the sovereign in perpetual motion,
so to speak, while transforming its presence into an exquisite and complex manifestation of
political influence.”).
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‘sovereign people’ well beyond the formal act of electoral authorization.”30 Larry
Kramer has recounted a complementary view in the democratic thought of James
Madison, relying on “the primacy of popular opinion in controlling a republican government, and the concomitant obligation this imposed on citizens to remain vigilant
and involved.”31 As he explains, “Madison’s politics are better characterized as a
conversation, a conversation in which the elite now led by persuasion an electorate
actively engaged in making its own judgments and decisions.”32 On these accounts,
representatives and citizens engage in a dynamic process of opinion formation, with
representatives responsive to the public opinion that emerges from and responds to
the political process.33
This approach calls for a continuing role for citizens in the democratic process.
Viewing citizens as intermittent ballot-casters limits the autonomy and sovereignty
of the people relative to their rulers.34 Commentators emphasize forms of democratic
practice extending beyond the vote, prominently the exercise of public discourse, as
crucial for democratic legitimacy.35 This framing dovetails with arguments that our
conception of voting rights should not be limited to the ability to cast a ballot, but must
also protect the ways in which votes are aggregated and elections yield governance
30

Id. at 5. On her account, “representation can encourage political participation insofar
as its deliberative and judgmental character expands politics beyond the narrow limits of
decision and voting.” Id. at 16.
31
Kramer, supra note 26, at 717.
32
Id. at 732; see also id. at 737–38 (“Note how the people’s control, while real and substantial, is not direct. It is indirect: mediated through popular responses to arguments and to
the action or inaction of representatives in different parts of different governments, representatives who are in turn taking their cues from the public.”).
33
The responsibility to be responsive to the opinions of their constituents is inherent
in the concept of representation itself. See HANNA FENICHEL PITKIN, THE CONCEPT OF
REPRESENTATION 232–33 (1967) (“[A] representative government requires that there be
machinery for the expression of the wishes of the represented, and that the government respond
to these wishes unless there are good reasons to the contrary.”).
34
See Guinier, supra note 27, at 3 (arguing that “elections—however they are conducted—
are an insufficient instrument of democratic accountability, democratic outcomes and democratic processes”); see also MALOY, supra note 26, at 17 (noting that “[v]oting and elections
are the institutional practices most directly associated with consent, but today they are usually
burdened with the double expectation of simultaneously effecting popular control,” an expectation they cannot meet).
35
See BARBER, supra note 27, at 136 (arguing that “ongoing talk,” and not just the vote,
is necessary for what he terms “strong democratic legitimacy”); Robert C. Post, Racist Speech,
Democracy, and the First Amendment, 32 WM. & MARY L. REV. 267, 282 (1991) (viewing
“public discourse” as providing legitimacy to results reached through the vote inasmuch as
“the normative essence of democracy is . . . located in the communicative processes necessary
to instill a sense of self-determination, and in the subordination of political decisionmaking
to those processes” (internal citation omitted)); Nadia Urbinati, Representation as Advocacy:
A Study of Democratic Deliberation, 28 POL. THEORY 758, 760 (2000) (arguing that “public
discourse is one of the main features that characterize and give value to democratic politics”).
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structures, so that all citizens can be included in “the practice of decisionmaking
through representatives.”36 As Pamela Karlan explains, “[t]hinking about voting in this
way requires abandoning the view of voting as a declaratory event—the act of pulling
a lever on Election Day—and replacing it with an image of voting as part of an ongoing
conversation.”37 Justice Breyer has likewise developed the argument, in both opinions
and non-judicial writings, that the Constitution embodies a model of “participatory
self-government” characterized by “active liberty,” consisting of “an active and constant participation in collective power,” and “the sharing of a nation’s sovereign authority among that nation’s citizens.”38 In short, the vote presents but one (undoubtedly
significant) moment in a larger continuing process of representative governance.
Emphasizing a top-down rather than bottom-up approach to this issue, Michael
Kang has recently called for attention not simply to electoral competition, but to
“democratic contestation” more broadly,39 a dynamic process extending beyond the
election in which political leaders compete to shape the political identities of the voting
public and in doing so “make[ ] possible the central goal of promoting mass participatory politics.”40 Like the model advanced here, in which dynamic interchange between
representatives and the public shapes the terms of representation, this conception of
the representative process rejects the notion of a pre-existing or naturally occurring
public opinion that representatives must identify, in favor of an ongoing process in
which representatives and citizens together forge a democratic practice.
These views, emerging from different contexts and in the service of varying
visions of a properly functioning democratic process, counsel against embracing a
36

Karlan, supra note 28, at 1716.
Id. In considering the scope of the Voting Rights Act, Kathryn Abrams argues for
“the right to a relationship of representation with an elected official, which begins before and
continues after the aggregative exercise of election day.” Kathryn Abrams, Relationships of
Representation in Voting Rights Act Jurisprudence, 71 TEX. L. REV. 1409, 1412 (1993); see
also Abrams, supra note 28, at 453 (proposing “a description of the political process that highlights not only ‘aggregative’ events such as elections, but the ongoing ‘interactive’ participation among interested groups that shapes and translates those events”). Lani Guinier argues
for a concept of “collective efficacy” to explore the ways in which citizens can mobilize and
participate in democracy outside of the voting context. See Guinier, supra note 27, at 35.
38
See STEPHEN BREYER, ACTIVE LIBERTY: INTERPRETING OUR DEMOCRATIC CONSTITUTION
4, 46 (2005) (quoting Benjamin Constant, The Liberty of the Ancients Compared with That
of the Moderns (1819), in POLITICAL WRITINGS 309, 318 (Biancamaria Fontana trans. & ed.
1988)); see also Nixon v. Shrink Mo. Gov’t PAC, 528 U.S. 377, 401 (2000) (Breyer, J.,
concurring) (emphasizing “the integrity of the electoral process—the means through which
a free society democratically translates political speech into concrete governmental action”).
39
See Michael S. Kang, Race and Democratic Contestation, 117 YALE L.J. 734, 738
(2008) (defining “democratic contestation” as “the deliberative competition among political
leaders to shape and frame the public’s understandings about elective politics, public policy,
and civic affairs”).
40
Id. at 740; see also id. at 762 (“A theory of democratic contestation therefore extends
beyond a narrow focus on elections to a broader consideration of ongoing legislative and
pluralistic politics.”).
37
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stark distinction between political activity and the vote. As I develop here, the election period approach offers the possibility of shading the bright line between elections
and politics and shaping a unitary process of democratic representation.
B. The Election Period
In designating a fixed period prior to federal elections in which certain broadcast
ads funded by corporations or unions would be restricted, BCRA demarcated an election period, a zone preceding the election in which the government would have enhanced regulatory authority for the purpose of protecting the democratic process.41
I suggest that the value of the election period model stems from its capacity to shape
a conception of the election that bridges the interests in a reliable vote and an effective
representative process. It does so by recognizing the role of the election period as a
time of enhanced democratic engagement and dynamic interaction between politicians
and citizens. While protection of the representative process does not inherently demand
enhanced regulatory power over forms of political speech, the acceptance of such restrictions in the context of protecting the vote argues for taking them seriously here
as well.
The pre-election period is a time of heightened engagement with the democratic
process: a time when both voters and political actors are more attentive to one another.42
41

See supra notes 20–23 and accompanying text.
See, e.g., Mills v. Alabama, 384 U.S. 214, 219 (1966) (noting that it is on election day
that campaigning “can be most effective”); McConnell v. FEC, 251 F. Supp. 2d 176, 793–94
(D.D.C. 2003) (Leon, J.) (discussing belief of interest groups “that the periods immediately
preceding elections are the most effective times to run issue advertisements discussing pending
legislation because the public’s interest in policy is at its peak”); 148 CONG. REC. S2096 (daily
ed. Mar. 20, 2002) (statement of Sen. Hutchinson) (“How many times have we heard that a
large portion of the voting public really doesn’t focus on the campaign until 2 weeks before
the election? . . . That is when the majority of the public begins to collect the data they have
been getting in the mail to start studying it. They start to listen to what is being said on television, which is where most people get their news.”). Vincent Blasi, Free Speech and the
Widening Gyre of Fund-Raising: Why Campaign Spending Limits May Not Violate the First
Amendment After All, 94 COLUM. L. REV. 1281, 1283 n.7 (1994), states that “the process of
representation really begins in the campaign itself” as “[t]hat is when future representatives
forge their political identities and often when constituents are most actively engaged in expressing their complaints and preferences.” Justice Kennedy has noted that “[u]ntil a few weeks
or even days before an election, many voters pay little attention to campaigns and even less to
the details of party politics,” Cal. Dem. Party v. Jones, 530 U.S. 567, 586 (2000) (Kennedy,
J., concurring), and acknowledged in his McConnell dissent the “crucial weeks before the
election.” McConnell v. FEC, 540 U.S. 93, 335 (2003) (Kennedy, J., dissenting). But see id.,
at 334 (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (referring to BCRA’s “crude temporal and geographic
proxies”). The Citizens United Court made this point as well. See Citizens United v. FEC,
No. 08-205, slip op. at 17 (U.S. Sup. Ct. Jan. 21, 2010). (“It is well known that the public
begins to concentrate on elections only in the weeks immediately before they are held.”); id.
42
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Political scientists have found that voters pay closer attention as the election draws
near43 and posit a “recency bias” (the “what have you done for me lately” phenomenon), where voters weigh more heavily their representatives’ recent actions, in response to which politicians seeking re-election attempt to accomplish more for their
constituents toward the end of their terms.44 These studies reflect a simple point: the
election period is not just when voting happens, but when citizens are most democratically engaged, and most actively participating in the work of self-government. As a
result, the election period is a time of “higher” politics, a time of heightened involvement and higher democratic stakes.45
On this account, the electoral process is the primary site in which the representative relationship is constructed. Indeed, “[c]ampaigns . . . are a main point—perhaps
the main point—of contact between officials and the populace over matters of public
policy.”46 The period in which the putative representative goes before the voters for
their approval is a time of creating that relationship, calling for special attention to
the proper functioning of the democratic process at that time. As the representative
relationship is historically a matter of constitutional concern,47 and is shaped by
at 45 (referring to “the critical preelection period”); id. at 56 (indicating that the “necessity”
for speech “is most evident . . . in the public dialogue preceding a real election”).
43
See, e.g., Andrew Gelman & Gary King, Why Are American Presidential Election
Campaign Polls So Variable When Votes Are So Predictable?, 23 BRIT. J. POL. SCI. 409,
434–35 (1993) (explaining that voters pay attention “disproportionately just before election
day”); Martin Gilens et al., The Mass Media and the Public’s Assessments of Presidential
Candidates, 1952–2000, 69 J. POL. 1160, 1170 (2007) (finding that “the impact of advertising on respondents’ presidential considerations is far stronger at election time than months
before”).
44
See, e.g., Sunil Ahuja, Electoral Status and Representation in the United States Senate:
Does Temporal Proximity to Election Matter?, 22 AM. POL. Q. 104, 114 (1994) (concluding
that “proximity to the next election has a clear impact on how United States senators cast their
votes”); Kenneth A. Shepsle et al., The Senate Electoral Cycle and Bicameral Appropriations
Politics, 53 AM. J. POL. SCI. 343, 344 (2009) (describing the “what have you done for me
lately” principle and presenting evidence regarding the distribution of federal money to states
and districts towards the end of Senatorial terms); cf. David E. Pozen, The Irony of Judicial
Elections, 108 COLUM. L. REV. 265, 287–88 (2008) (“As standing for reelection approaches,
judges become significantly more punitive, meting out longer sentences and imposing the death
penalty more frequently.”).
45
While studies suggest that many citizens end up making the same decisions they would
have anyway—in other words, they revert to their longstanding political preferences—it is
during the election period that voters pay sufficient attention to ultimately decide. See Dennis
F. Thompson, Two Concepts of Corruption: Making Campaigns Safe for Democracy, 73 GEO.
WASH. L. REV. 1036, 1050–53 (2005) (discussing this point and citing relevant literature).
46
WILLIAM H. RIKER, THE STRATEGY OF RHETORIC: CAMPAIGNING FOR THE AMERICAN
CONSTITUTION 3 (Randall L. Calvert et al. eds., 1996).
47
See Blasi, supra note 42, at 1302 (arguing that “the quality of representation” is “an
interest that is itself of constitutional dimension” and that “[t]o a considerable degree, the
debates over the Constitution were debates over how best to achieve a high quality of representation”); Kramer, supra note 26, at 727 (elaborating Madison’s theory of “deliberative
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political activity and speech in the electoral setting, we might broaden the narrow
focus on ballot-casting in our assessment of the democratic process.
We see in the international context a formalized model of the election period.
The United Kingdom presents a prominent example, in which the election period
stems from the unfixed nature of the political calendar, where elections are called
at a certain point and then occur some set period later.48 The bounded nature of this
election period allows for significant state regulation and shapes the election as a
managed enterprise distinct from the surrounding non-electoral world. The United
Kingdom also limits independent expenditures in elections and adopts a broad view
of what constitutes election-related expenditures, tightly circumscribing outside involvement in the electoral process.49 The Canadian context presents another election
period model, in which the state can limit expenditures to ensure a level playing field,
in contrast with a largely unregulated broader political sphere.50 A number of countries
ban political broadcast advertising within a designated period preceding the election,
and some limit campaigning in the days immediately before the election as well.51
The United Kingdom goes further on this, barring from television and the radio all
political advertising at all times,52 by parties or independent groups, thus rejecting a
purely election-based regulatory line for political speech. These regulatory schemes
reflect different speech rights traditions and have been justified on grounds of protecting both voters and candidates from undue influence.53
democracy” in which “a government is republican only if and to the extent that its actions are
guided and controlled by public opinion”); cf. Zephyr Teachout, The Anti-Corruption Principle,
94 CORNELL L. REV. 341, 342 (2009) (showing “how the fight against corruption is a central
part of the United States Constitution— its historical origins, the language of the debates around
it, its substance, and its structure”).
48
See Issacharoff, supra note 10, at 377–78.
49
See K.D. EWING, THE COST OF DEMOCRACY: PARTY FUNDING IN MODERN BRITISH
POLITICS 148–51, 157–59 (2007) (discussing spending limits and third parties); see also
Bowman v. United Kingdom, 26 Eur. Ct. H.R. 1 (1998) (striking down £5 spending limit for
third parties).
50
See Issacharoff, supra note 10, at 389–91.
51
See, e.g., FRITZ PLASSER with GUNDA PLASSER, GLOBAL POLITICAL CAMPAIGNING: A
WORLDWIDE ANALYSIS OF CAMPAIGN PROFESSIONALS AND THEIR PRACTICES 144 (2002)
(describing election period campaign restrictions in Israel); Jacob Rowbottom, Access to the
Airwaves and Equality: The Case against Political Advertising on the Broadcast Media, in
PARTY FUNDING AND CAMPAIGN FINANCING IN INTERNATIONAL PERSPECTIVE 77, 94 (K.D.
Ewing & Samuel Issacharoff eds., 2006) (noting Italian broadcast ad restrictions).
52
The restrictions apply to advertising “on behalf of any body whose objects are wholly
or mainly of a political nature” as well as “any advertisement which is directed towards any
political end.” Andrew Scott, “A Monstrous and Unjustifiable Infringement”?: Political
Expression and the Broadcasting Ban on Advocacy Advertising, 66 MOD. L. REV. 224, 228
(2003) (quoting Section 8(2) and 92(2) of the Broadcasting Act of 1990, regulating television
and radio respectively); see also Rowbottom, supra note 51, at 77 (“Commercially purchased
political advertisements have never been permitted on the UK broadcast media.”).
53
See, e.g., Bowman, 318 Eur. Ct. H.R., at 16–17 (listing bases for spending limit).

2010] THE ELECTION PERIOD & REGULATION OF DEMOCRATIC PROCESS

547

The election period framework appears in domestic settings as well.54 The union
representation election setting provides an example, as the National Labor Relations
Board (NLRB) has established an election period preceding the vote (which is called
rather than held at a fixed time) in which courts have allowed restrictions on speech
that might otherwise be constitutionally questionable.55 In particular, employers are
prohibited from either threatening or promising benefits to employees with regard to
union representation and the NLRB has prohibited electoral appeals based on racial
prejudice when they are sufficiently “inflammatory.”56 Other restrictions are premised on preventing an inappropriate effect on the “sober and thoughtful choice” of
the employee-voters.57 These provisions shape a UK-like election period before union
representation elections.
In the political realm, examples of election period regulations include restrictions
on the use of the Congressional franking privilege in the pre-election period and the
Department of Justice’s policy limiting investigations of election crimes in the preelection and balloting periods.58 In the campaign finance setting, BCRA also employs
54

See CBS, Inc. v. FCC, 453 U.S. 367, 388 (1981) (affirming the FCC’s authority to
determine when the presidential campaign has begun and the obligations of the reasonable
access rule attach). A bill introduced in 2008 in the Senate would have set the election period
as the standard for limiting “robocalls” as well. See Robocall Privacy Act of 2008, S. 2624,
110th Cong. (2008) (limiting the use of “political robocalls”—meaning outbound telephone
calls playing a recorded message (without a person available to speak) and which “promotes,
supports, attacks, or opposes a candidate for Federal office”—during the BCRA election
period, 60 days before the general election and 30 days before the primary).
55
See Matthew T. Bodie, Information and the Market for Union Representation, 94 VA.
L. REV. 1, 7–15 (2008) (discussing restrictions in union elections); Neuborne, supra note 11,
at 801 (discussing union representation election as a bounded institution for First Amendment
purposes).
56
See NLRB v. Gissel Packing Co., 395 U.S. 575, 618 (1969) (holding that “an employer
is free to communicate to his employees any of his general views about unionism or any of his
specific views about a particular union, so long as the communications do not contain a ‘threat
of reprisal or force or promise of benefit’” (quoting the National Labor Relations Act, 29
U.S.C. § 158(c) (2006))).
57
See Peerless Plywood Co., 107 N.L.R.B. 427, 429 (1953) (instituting rule “that employers and unions alike will be prohibited from making election speeches on company time
to massed assemblies of employees within 24 hours before the scheduled time for conducting
an election” because “last-minute speeches by either employers or unions delivered to massed
assemblies of employees on company time have an unwholesome and unsettling effect and tend
to interfere with that sober and thoughtful choice which a free election is designed to reflect”).
58
Both the Senate and House of Representatives restrict the use of the Congressional
franking privilege for candidates before elections: within 60 days of a primary, general, or
runoff election in the Senate, and within 90 days in the House. See 39 U.S.C. § 3210(a)(6)(A)
(2006); Standing Rules of the Senate, Rule XL(1); Rules of the House of Representatives,
Rule XXIV(8).
The Department of Justice’s manual on election crimes specifies that when investigating
election crimes, voters should generally not be interviewed in the pre-election period, as “[s]uch
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an election period framework to define the types of federal election activities for
which state and local party committees cannot use “soft money” funds, providing that
such activities include “voter registration activity during the period that begins on the
date that is 120 days before the date a regularly scheduled Federal election is held and
ends on the date of the election.”59 Likewise, the FEC has established the presumption
that political party events at which the candidate appears are “election-related” (and
subject to regulation) if occurring after January 1 of the election year, and “partyrelated” if occurring before January 1.60 Such provisions again reflect the intuition
that activity in the pre-election period is somehow distinct.
The framework I advance here describes not a formalized election period but a
liminal region where the voting domain meshes into the larger political world. This
pre-election zone would not be a comprehensively regulated area where all manner
of speech limitations are given deference, but neither would traditionally robust political speech protections apply, leaving a middle ground of permissible targeted regulation, perhaps governed by a proportionality approach like that advanced by Justice
Breyer.61 I seek to frame the election period as a viable framework for regulatory
efforts in the election context, recognizing that any particular regulation may or may
not be constitutional.
The temporal approach to the regulation of political advertising stems from the
idea of elections as distinct institutions under the First Amendment.62 This “First
Amendment institutions” model recognizes that courts have treated political speech
differently in the electoral process, enforcing the right less vigorously as a means of
overt investigative steps may chill legitimate voting activities” and “are also likely to be perceived by voters and candidates as an intrusion into the election.” FEDERAL PROSECUTION OF
ELECTION OFFENSES 12 (7th ed. May 2007), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/criminal/pin/
docs/electbook-0507.pdf. In particular, the manual provides that DOJ “views any voter interviews in the pre-election and balloting periods, other than interviews of a complainant and any
witnesses he or she may identify, as beyond a preliminary investigation” and that the Public
Integrity Section should be consulted before conducting any such interviews. See id. at 92;
see also UNITED STATES ATTORNEYS’ MANUAL § 9-85.210, available at http://www.usdoj
.gov/usao/eousa/foia_reading_room/usam/ (same).
59
2 U.S.C. § 431(20)(A)(i) (2006); see also Bauer, supra note 23 (advancing this provision as another election period framing, as well as 11 C.F.R. § 100.24(a)(1)(i) (2009), which
treats as federal election activity any get-out-the-vote programs conducted after “the date of
the earliest filing deadline for access to the primary election ballot for Federal candidates as
determined by State law” or in states without primaries, after January 1 of the election year).
60
See 11 C.F.R. § 110.8(e)(2)(i-ii) (2009); see also Bauer, supra note 23 (discussing this
provision).
61
See also Nixon v. Shrink Mo. Gov’t PAC, 528 U.S. 377, 402–03 (2000) (Breyer, J.,
concurring); Ysursa v. Pocatello Educ. Assoc., 555 U.S. ___, 129 S. Ct. 1093, 1103 (2009)
(Breyer, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (asking “whether the statute imposes a
burden upon speech that is disproportionate in light of the other interests the government seeks
to achieve”).
62
See supra note 11 (listing sources).
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protecting the vote.63 Following this model, some scholars called for an election
period framing before the enactment of BCRA. For example, Richard Briffault
proposed a definition of regulable election speech based on “(i) content, (ii) timing,
and (iii) the amount of money involved,” on the premise that the express advocacy
framing was ineffective and as consistent with the broader regulation of elections as
“mechanism[s] of collective choice.”64 In another formulation, Edwin Baker argued
that electoral speech should be seen “as an integral part of the institutionally bound
electoral process” such that campaign speech and other forms of “overtly electionoriented speech” (presumably a standard similar to express advocacy) be subject to
regulation for the purpose of “promot[ing] the accuracy of the translation of the public
will into efficacious political power,” as necessary for the process of “democratic willformation”: a means of translating public opinion into election results.65 Burt Neuborne
likewise advocated a temporal framing as a means of identifying speech within the
electoral institution.66 These proposals envision the election period as a penumbral
space surrounding the election in which voters make voting choices.
The election period framework advanced here differs from these in emphasizing
the formation of the representative relationship rather than the citizen’s electoral
choices alone. This framework tracks the distinction that Dennis Thompson has
drawn between two “concepts of corruption” in the campaign area: “governmental
corruption,” the traditional notion of corruption involving the behavior of government
officials, and “electoral corruption,” which focuses on “the integrity of the elections
and the campaigns that lead up to them.”67 As Professor Thompson explains, “[p]rivate interests can seek to influence politicians in office, or they can seek to influence
which politicians win office.”68 The difference is whether we are most concerned
about influence on politicians or on voters, though these of course overlap in that private actors may seek to influence voters in order to obtain influence over politicians.69
As this framing suggests, my concern is not for the electoral campaign in the sense of
pre-election efforts to persuade voters whom to vote for but for the campaign period
as the time of engagement between citizens and candidates.
In analyzing the treatment of the campaign in election law, James Gardner has
argued that the Court has preferred a “tabulative” model over a “deliberative” model
of political campaigns: viewing the election as a means of calculating pre-existing support for the candidates rather than a transformative process in which public deliberation
63

See supra note 15 and accompanying text.
Briffault, supra note 2, at 1769, 1776–80.
65
Baker, supra note 11, at 3, 33, 37–45, 50. “Regulation may be necessary for elections
to perform the crucial democratic role of properly connecting public opinion with institutionalized structures of democratic will formation.” Id. at 45.
66
See Neuborne, supra note 11, at 809 (suggesting that we “separate the bulk of campaign
speech from the rest of the speech universe by defining it temporally and descriptively”).
67
Thompson, supra note 45, at 1036–37.
68
Id. at 1039.
69
See id.
64
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can shape preferences and affect election results.70 Such a tabulative model presupposes
a distinction between elections and a broader sphere of politics, envisioning political
preferences as formed somewhere outside campaigns,71 and may have the hydraulic
effect of moving deliberation out of the election period.72
In this Article, I resist this tabulative approach, seeing the heightened politics of
the election period as a time of increased democratic engagement and attention, the
raw materials of effective deliberation. The election period presents the moment of
highest engagement with the continuing democratic process and, as optimal representation calls for engagement with the expressed interests of constituents, is therefore
a crucial moment for democracy, not only with regard to election results but also the
actions to be taken by elected officials. As a result, limited regulation designed to
promote an effective democratic process is particularly appropriate in this setting.
In short, to the extent particular forms of regulation are at all appropriate, I argue for
their application in the election period as well as to the vote itself.
This Part has advanced a model of the election period as a framework for regulation
of the democratic process. I now turn to the development of the doctrine, exploring
the treatment of both the regulatory line and the acceptable rationales for regulation
in order to assess the fit of this model with the Court’s decisions.
II. THE REGULATORY LINE: EXPRESS ADVOCACY AND ELECTIONEERING
COMMUNICATIONS
BCRA presents another step in Congress’s effort to regulate corporate participation
in the political process, a goal it has pursued for over one hundred years. The Court’s
rulings in response to these efforts have indicated that corporate political speech in the
election setting may constitutionally be regulated in at least some ways73 (at least for
70

James A. Gardner, Deliberation or Tabulation? The Self-Undermining Constitutional
Architecture of Election Campaigns, 54 BUFF. L. REV. 1413, 1417 (2007) (concluding that
“although the American constitutional regime pays emphatic lip service to the ideal of reasoned persuasion in elections, its actual institutional arrangements in fact presuppose just the
opposite—election campaigns that are thin rather than thick, that are aggregative rather than
deliberative, that are aimed at counting political preferences, not creating them”).
71
See id. (arguing that “American constitutional law rests on the presupposition that public
opinion is exogenous to political campaigns rather than endogenous to them—that political
opinion, in other words, is something citizens bring to election campaigns, not something they
formulate during campaigns”).
72
See id. at 1475–76 (“The main effect, then, of substituting tabulative for deliberative
election campaigns is probably not to destroy or diminish democratic politics, but rather to
shift their locus from the confined realm of the election campaign to the broader realm of the
political.”); Baker, supra note 11, at 37–45; Thompson, supra note 45, at 1053–56; see also
Samuel Issacharoff & Pamela S. Karlan, The Hydraulics of Campaign Finance Reform, 77
TEX. L. REV. 1705 (1999) (describing hydraulic effects in campaign finance law).
73
See FEC v. Beaumont, 539 U.S. 146 (2003) (upholding limitations on corporate political
contributions). But see Citizens United v. FEC, No. 08-205, slip op. at 9 (U.S. Sup. Ct. Jan. 21,
2010) (invalidating restrictions on corporate political advocacy).
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now), leaving us to consider exactly what speech may be subject to regulation.74 What
distinguishes regulable from protected speech and what conception of free speech
and the democratic process shapes this regulatory line? This Part explores the shifting regulatory line—in its “express advocacy” and “electioneering communications”
forms—assessing the concerns that have shaped its placement. I provide this account
of the doctrine to demonstrate that the reinstatement of the express advocacy line in
WRTL reflects a regulatory border shaped by a tight focus on the voting process rather
than concerns about vagueness, the original basis for the line. As I develop below, this
focus is consistent with the Court’s approach across election law.75 Though Citizens
United has made the express advocacy line inoperative in the context of restricting
corporate political advocacy, this discussion serves to illustrate the shaping of the
elections/politics line in this setting as a substantive ideal.
A. The Pre-BCRA Framework—Issue Advocacy and Express Advocacy
The Supreme Court’s decision in Buckley v. Valeo drew the distinction between
“express advocacy” and “issue advocacy” thereafter enshrined in campaign finance
jurisprudence.76 Buckley presented a challenge to the Federal Election Campaign
Act Amendments of 1974 (FECA), which provided that “[n]o person may make any
expenditure . . . relative to a clearly identified candidate during a calendar year which,
when added to all other expenditures made by such person during the year advocating
the election or defeat of such candidate, exceeds $ 1,000.”77 In light of vagueness concerns, the Court construed the “relative to” language “to apply only to expenditures
for communications that in express terms advocate the election or defeat of a clearly
identified candidate for federal office.”78 This construction gave rise to the “magic
words” doctrine, which limited “the application of [the statute] to communications
containing express words of advocacy of election or defeat, such as ‘vote for,’
‘elect,’ ‘support,’ ‘cast your ballot for,’ ‘Smith for Congress,’ ‘vote against,’ ‘defeat,’
‘reject.’”79 The Court distinguished this “express advocacy” from “‘funds spent to
propagate one’s views on issues without expressly calling for a candidate’s election
74

See FEC v. Wis. Right to Life, Inc., 551 U.S. 449, 482 (2007) (describing “the issue we
do have to decide” as “defining what speech qualifies as the functional equivalent of express
advocacy subject to such a ban”); see also Briffault, supra note 7, at 167 (arguing that because
“campaign speech may be regulated—through disclosure requirements, contribution limits,
and the ban on corporate and union treasury funds—in ways that would be constitutionally unacceptable if applied more generally to other political speech . . . there needs to be some line
distinguishing election-related speech from other political speech”).
75
See infra Part IV.
76
424 U.S. 1, 39–44 (1976).
77
Id. at 39 (quoting FECA § 608 (e)(1)).
78
Id. at 44.
79
Id. at 44 n.52.
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or defeat.’”80 Notwithstanding this narrowing, the Court struck down the expenditure limits under the First Amendment,81 though it approved the application of disclosure requirements to expenditures for express advocacy,82 emphasizing that the
regulated speech was “unambiguously campaign related.”83 The Buckley Court based
the express advocacy line primarily on concerns about the vagueness of the statutory
language, gesturing also towards constitutional concerns about the regulation of
speech not obviously related to the election campaign.84
A separate provision of FECA, stemming originally from the Tillman Act of
1907,85 prohibited corporations and unions from making campaign contributions or
expending treasury funds “in connection with any [federal] election.”86 In FEC v.
Massachusetts Citizens for Life (MCFL), the Court construed this “in connection
with” provision as it did the “relative to” provision at issue in Buckley, holding, again
because of vagueness concerns, that “an expenditure must constitute ‘express advocacy’
in order to be subject to the prohibition.”87 The Court did not decide the constitutional
validity of the expenditure provision in MCFL,88 concluding that ideological corporations like MCFL could not be subject to the prohibition under any circumstances.89
Four years later, in Austin v. Michigan Chamber of Commerce, the Court upheld a
80

Id. at 44 (quoting non-governmental appellees’ brief).
Id. at 51.
82
See id. at 80–82.
83
Id. at 81.
84
See also McConnell v. FEC, 540 U.S. 93, 277–83 (2003) (Thomas, J., dissenting in
part) (discussing constitutional concerns in Buckley).
85
Pub. L. No. 59-36, 34 Stat. 864, 864–65 (1907) (prohibiting federal corporations from
making a money contribution “in connection with any election to any political office” and any
corporation from making a money contribution “in connection with any [federal] election”).
86
2 U.S.C. § 441b (2006); see also FEC v. Mass. Citizens for Life, Inc., 479 U.S. 238,
245–46 (1986) (discussing statutory language).
87
479 U.S. at 248–49.
88
The Court did not determine the constitutionality of the expenditures provision at any
point during its more than fifty-year history before being amended by BCRA. See id. at 263
(withholding determination of ultimate constitutional question); Pipefitters Local Union No. 562
v. United States, 407 U.S. 385, 400 (1972) (noting that the Court’s “disposition makes decision
of the constitutional issues premature, and we therefore do not decide them”); United States
v. UAW-CIO, 352 U.S. 567 (1957) (withholding determination of constitutional questions);
United States v. Cong. of Indus. Orgs., 335 U.S. 106, 123–24 (1948) (finding an earlier incarnation of the expenditure restriction did not reach union endorsement of candidate printed
in an in-house publication and not intended for the public).
89
The MCFL Court gave three reasons for this exemption: that the organization “was
formed for the express purpose of promoting political ideas” and did not engage in business,
thus ensuring “that political resources reflect political support”; that it had no shareholders or
others with a claim on its assets or earnings, allowing those connected to the organization to
easily disaffiliate if they disagree with its political positions; and that it was “not established
by a business corporation or labor union” and did not “accept contributions from such entities,”
preventing it from serving as a conduit for problematic spending. MCFL, 479 U.S. at 263–64.
81

2010] THE ELECTION PERIOD & REGULATION OF DEMOCRATIC PROCESS

553

Michigan law prohibiting corporate expenditures “in support of, or in opposition to”
candidates for state office, approving regulation of corporate express advocacy.90
The effect of these rulings was to draw a bright line between ads that used the
“magical and forbidden” words of express advocacy,91 which could be regulated in
some ways, and other ads, treated as “issue advocacy,”92 which could not. On this
framing, issue advocacy is not a category with defined content, but is the residual category for political ads that are not express advocacy. As Buckley indicates, the term
“express” modifies the implicit term “electoral”: express electoral advocacy is thus
distinguished from other advocacy, which can be either non-expressly electoral, or
not electoral at all.93 Having defined “election-related” as limited to the presence of
the magic words, this framework characterizes ads without the magic words as not
electoral advocacy, even though on some other definition (such as ordinary English
usage), a particular issue advocacy ad could be seen as designed or likely to influence
an election.94 As this suggests, significant distinctions might be drawn within the
issue advocacy category.
Regulating political speech on the basis of the election demands some method
of identifying which speech is within the electoral domain. Limiting regulation to express advocacy serves as a reliable if underinclusive means of calibrating regulation
to election-related speech.95 The fact that any regulation would be implemented in the
heat of political campaigns by potentially partisan regulators calls for an easily administered bright-line in this setting.96 The limitation to express advocacy clearly establishes what is and is not allowed, with little risk of confusion or doubt on the part of
speakers or regulators. In doing so, this model avoids both a more calibrated but
90

494 U.S. 652, 654 (1990) (involving a statute that prohibited “corporations from using
corporate treasury funds for independent expenditures in support of, or in opposition to, any
candidate in elections to state office”). Unlike FECA, the Michigan law did not apply to unions.
Id. at 665–66 (rejecting argument that statute was underinclusive in not applying to independent
expenditures by labor unions).
91
FEC v. Wis. Right to Life, Inc., 551 U.S. 449, 489 (2007) (Scalia, J., concurring in part
and concurring in the judgment) (noting that “the ad at issue in Austin used the magical and
forbidden words of express advocacy” (citing Austin, 494 U.S. at 714)).
92
See supra note 80 and accompanying text.
93
See Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 44 & n.52 (1976) (referring to “express words of
advocacy of election or defeat”).
94
Examples are not hard to imagine, or to find. See, for example, the infamous Yellowtail
ad described in McConnell v. FEC, 540 U.S. 93, 193–94 n.78 (2003).
95
See Spencer Overton, Restraint and Responsibility: Judicial Review of Campaign Reform,
61 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 663, 702 (2004) (“By erring so heavily away from statutes that are
overinclusive, the judicial rule effectively mandates underinclusiveness by prohibiting legislatures from responding to activity that poses a threat of corruption but does not include express
advocacy.”).
96
See SAMUEL ISSACHAROFF, PAMELA S. KARLAN & RICHARD H. PILDES, THE LAW OF
DEMOCRACY: LEGAL STRUCTURE OF THE POLITICAL PROCESS 539–40 (2d ed. 2001) (discussing
this point).
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more discretionary approach as well as a more protective but more speech-restrictive
approach, both of which raise heightened First Amendment concerns.
The express advocacy line thus collapses two separate distinctions: between general political speech (issue advocacy in a colloquial sense) and political speech that
is election-related and between express electoral advocacy and ads classifiable as electoral advocacy though they lack the magic words. The difficult questions involve
speech that falls in that middle category—non-express electoral advocacy—asking
whether it can be identified in practice. The goal of re-separating these collapsed
distinctions looms in the post-BCRA cases.
B. BCRA and the Regulation of Electioneering Communications
Savvy political actors quickly realized, assuming they didn’t already know, that
political ads could be as or more effective without the magic words.97 As Justice
Souter later noted, “narrowing the corporate-union electioneering limitation to magic
words soon reduced it to futility.”98 By the 1990s, hundreds of millions of dollars were
being spent on “issue ads” which, though patently intended to influence elections, were
immune from challenge because they avoided express terms of electoral advocacy.99
The proliferation of such ads bolstered those who doubted that the use of particular
wording was the appropriate trigger for permissible regulation of corporate-funded
political ads.100
Congress enacted BCRA in 2002, dramatically reshaping campaign finance law.101
As relevant here, BCRA redrew the regulatory line for corporate political advertising
in the election setting, prohibiting a corporation or union from using general treasury
funds to pay for an “electioneering communication.”102 To the extent the concern with
FECA’s “relative to” language was its vagueness, the problem was solved. In the
words of the McConnell Court, BCRA’s definition of electioneering communications
“raises none of the vagueness concerns that drove our analysis in Buckley.”103
97

See McConnell, 540 U.S. at 193 & n.77 (“Not only can advertisers easily evade the line
by eschewing the use of magic words, but they would seldom choose to use such words even
if permitted.”).
98
FEC v. Wis. Right to Life, Inc., 551 U.S. 449, 515 (Souter, J., dissenting).
99
See McConnell, 540 U.S. at 127–28 n.20.
100
The soft money provisions of BCRA were also in large part a response to distortions
introduced by the express advocacy line. See id. at 126–28 (noting that while political parties
“could not use soft money to sponsor ads that used any magic words[,] . . . [s]o-called issue
ads . . . not only could be financed with soft money but could be aired without disclosing the
identity of, or any other information about, their sponsors”).
101
See supra note 7.
102
2 U.S.C. § 441b(b)(2) (2006); see supra notes 20–22 and accompanying text.
103
McConnell, 540 U.S. at 194; see also WRTL, 551 U.S. at 457 (noting that this definition
is “clear and expansive”); id. at 499 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and concurring in the
judgment) (“Section 203’s line is bright, but it bans vast amounts of political advocacy indistinguishable from hitherto protected speech.”).
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This new definition of regulable speech highlighted questions about where the
regulatory line could constitutionally be drawn. Like all political observers, Congress
knew that issue advocacy and express advocacy were “functionally identical in important respects.”104 Buckley had distinguished the two categories not as being functionally distinct, but rather as facially distinct, thereby curing the vagueness defect.105
Concluding that the bright-line rule was ineffective, BCRA supplemented the contentbased characterization approach governing expenditures with a context-based rule
redrawing the regulatory line as a temporal zone preceding the election.106
Though the Court upheld the electioneering communications provision on a facial
challenge in McConnell v. FEC, in what was described as a “stunning triumph” for
supporters of campaign finance reform,107 the majority opinion subtly subverted
Congress’s reframing of regulable election speech. In an unusually brief discussion
of the First Amendment questions raised by the provision,108 the Court rejected plaintiffs’ argument that the electioneering communications provision was overbroad in
regulating more than express advocacy. The Court explained that
[t]his argument fails to the extent that the issue ads broadcast
during the 30- and 60-day periods preceding federal primary and
general elections are the functional equivalent of express advocacy. The justifications for the regulation of express advocacy
apply equally to ads aired during those periods if the ads are intended to influence the voters’ decisions and have that effect.109
By describing the target of the provision as ads that are the “functional equivalent”
of express advocacy, the Court blurred the statutory scheme. While BCRA moved
beyond the issue/express advocacy framework, the Court enshrined that distinction in
campaign finance law by upholding the provision to the extent it regulates only the
“functional equivalent” of express advocacy.110 In other words, upholding the new
104

McConnell, 540 U.S. at 126.
Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 76–82 (1976) (discussing the vagueness of BCRA).
106
“Expenditures,” in the sense of corporate spending that expressly advocates for or against
a candidate, remained prohibited under BCRA. See 2 U.S.C. § 441b(a).
107
Briffault, supra note 7, at 147 (describing McConnell as the “single greatest legal victory
for campaign finance regulation” in the post-Buckley period).
108
See Heather K. Gerken, Lost in the Political Thicket: The Court, Election Law, and the
Doctrinal Interregnum, 153 U. PA. L. REV. 503, 515 & n.55 (2004) (noting that “[m]any commentators simply dismiss McConnell as an example of poor judicial craftsmanship” and providing sources); Richard L. Hasen, Buckley is Dead, Long Live Buckley: The New Campaign
Finance Incoherence of McConnell v. Federal Election Commission, 153 U. PA. L. REV. 31,
54 (2004) (characterizing as “surprising” that the majority opinion “devoted only a single
paragraph” to the First Amendment overbreadth issue).
109
McConnell, 540 U.S. at 206.
110
The Court did exclude “genuine issue ads.” Id. at 206 n.88 (assuming “that the interests
that justify the regulation of campaign speech might not apply to the regulation of genuine
issue ads”).
105
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provision by virtue of its being functionally identical to the express advocacy approach
maintains the relevance of that line.
The Court’s insistence that the express advocacy line is not constitutionally mandated suggests that the “functional equivalent” language was not intended to reinstate
a content-based requirement like the express advocacy rule.111 Rather, this language
required that the function or effect of the newly regulated speech be equivalent—
that by “intend[ing] to influence the voters’ decisions and hav[ing] that effect”112 the
speech create the same harm as express advocacy, thus allowing for its regulation.113
We might then read McConnell as an attempt to shift the basis of regulation from the
type of speech at issue to the intent and effect of the relevant speech. The continued
reliance on the express advocacy model would allow for the rejection of this approach
just a few years later.
C. WRTL and the Return of the Express Advocacy Line
McConnell appeared to bless a new era of campaign finance regulation in which
Congress was granted a larger regulatory sphere due to the harms threatened by corporate election speech. Three years later, however, the Court unanimously ruled that the
decision on the facial challenge in McConnell did not foreclose as-applied challenges
to the BCRA restrictions.114 This holding, in response to an as-applied challenge to
the electioneering communications rule by WRTL, foreshadowed a decision the next
Term that would raise doubts about the vitality of McConnell and invigorate questions
about the regulation of election speech.
McConnell’s framing proved significant on WRTL’s as-applied challenge to the
electioneering communications rule. Chief Justice Roberts’s principal opinion makes
much of the “functional equivalent” phrasing and relies on what it saw as McConnell’s
limitation of the BCRA provision to express advocacy and its functional equivalent
to justify narrow readings of the previously recognized state interests in regulation.115
111

See id. at 190–92 (explaining that “the express advocacy restriction was an endpoint
of statutory interpretation, not a first principle of constitutional law” and again, one page later,
that “a plain reading of Buckley makes clear that the express advocacy limitation, in both the
expenditure and the disclosure contexts, was the product of statutory interpretation rather
than a constitutional command”).
112
Id. at 206.
113
The McConnell majority appeared to like this “functional” formulation. See id. at 126
(“While the distinction between ‘issue’ and express advocacy seemed neat in theory, the two
categories of advertisements proved functionally identical in important respects.”); id. at 193
(“Indeed, the unmistakable lesson from the record in this litigation, as all three judges on the
District Court agreed, is that Buckley’s magic-words requirement is functionally meaningless.”).
114
Wis. Right to Life, Inc. v. FEC, 546 U.S. 410, 411–12 (2006) (“In upholding § 203
against a facial challenge, we did not purport to resolve future as-applied challenges.”).
115
FEC v. Wis. Right to Life, Inc., 551 U.S. 449, 477-81 (2007) (principal opinion). The
principal opinion is joined only by Justice Alito.
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Because the principal opinion purports to follow McConnell in concluding that the
express advocacy line is not constitutionally required,116 we might question why it
places so much weight on that distinction. Ultimately, WRTL holds that only express
advocacy or its functional equivalent may be regulated, with “functional equivalent”
defined as whether the ad “is susceptible of no reasonable interpretation other than as
an appeal to vote for or against a specific candidate.”117 This reads “functional equivalent” to mean the equivalent type of speech,118 in tension with the McConnell framing, which was based on the intent and effect—the “function”—of the speech. Despite
concluding that the electioneering communications restrictions were unconstitutional
as applied to the WRTL ad at issue, the Court maintained that it was not revisiting or
overruling McConnell.119
The resurrection of the express advocacy standard in WRTL raised questions about
the distinction between issue advocacy and express advocacy. In their separate opinions, both Justice Scalia and Justice Souter treat the distinction as largely meaningless.120 In contrast, the principal opinion indicates that speech that expressly solicits
votes is qualitatively different than other political speech, and presents the first postBuckley effort by the Supreme Court to articulate a substantive basis for the distinct
treatment of express advocacy.
In their “widely divergent” WRTL opinions, Justice Scalia and Justice Souter
agree on at least one point beyond the fact that the principal opinion silently overrules
McConnell:121 that the distinction between express advocacy and issue advocacy is of
limited constitutional relevance. Justice Scalia makes clear his opposition to regulation of any political speech, whether or not expressly intended to affect the election.122
116

Id. at 474 n.7 (“Buckley’s intermediate step of statutory construction on the way to its
constitutional holding does not dictate a constitutional test. The Buckley Court’s ‘express
advocacy restriction was an endpoint of statutory interpretation, not a first principle of constitutional law.’” (quoting McConnell, 540 U.S. at 190)).
117
Id. at 470.
118
Richard Briffault describes this as “linguistic equivalence.” See Richard Briffault,
WRTL II: The Sharpest Turn in Campaign Finance’s Long and Winding Road, 1 ALB. GOV’T
L. REV. 101, 117 (2008) (noting that “[f]or Chief Justice Roberts, an ad is the functional
equivalent of express advocacy only if it is the linguistic equivalent of an express ad”).
119
WRTL, 551 U.S. at 482 (“McConnell held that express advocacy of a candidate or his
opponent by a corporation shortly before an election may be prohibited, along with the functional equivalent of such express advocacy. We have no occasion to revisit that determination
today.”).
120
Cf. McConnell, 540 U.S. at 193 (noting that “the unmistakable lesson from the record
in this litigation . . . is that Buckley’s magic-words requirement is functionally meaningless”).
121
See WRTL, 551 U.S. at 498 n.7 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and concurring in the
judgment) (noting “that seven Justices of this Court, having widely divergent views concerning the constitutionality of the restrictions at issue, agree that the opinion effectively overrules
McConnell without saying so”).
122
Justice Scalia’s argument recalls Justice Douglas’ dissent in the UAW-CIO case fifty
years earlier: “The Court asks whether the broadcast constituted ‘active electioneering’ or
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Inasmuch as the distinction cannot be drawn except where the speaker self-identifies
the speech as regulable by using a magic word and to the extent that any restriction of
political speech should be constitutionally impermissible, Justice Scalia argues that
courts should not further distinguish between forms of advocacy,123 and indicates that
the only virtue of the express advocacy rule is that it limits the speech subject to regulation.124 On this view, the First Amendment simply does not permit regulation of
speech to protect the deliberative process.125
In his dissent, Justice Souter likewise downplays any substantive distinction between express and issue advocacy but for the opposite reason: because the purpose
of the regulation is to protect the democratic process by limiting the influence of corporate and union money,126 what matters for constitutional purposes is whether the speech
presents the relevant threat, not any formal characterization. So long as the regulated
speech is related to the electoral process, and the regulatory line is sufficiently clear
so as to not chill other speech, the Court need not draw difficult distinctions except in
individual cases where speech falls under the provision but is indisputably not electionrelated.127 This approach maintains a distinction between election-related and other
political speech, but broadens the parameters of the election domain. In rejecting substantive distinctions between different forms of political speech and urging either
wholesale rejection of or broad deference to campaign finance regulation, these conflicting approaches are reminiscent of the indication from roughly the same configuration of Justices that Buckley’s treatment of contributions and expenditures should
be reconsidered.128
simply stated ‘the record of particular candidates on economic issues.’ What possible difference
can it make under the First Amendment whether it was one or the other? The First Amendment
covers the entire spectrum.” United States v. UAW-CIO, 352 U.S. 567, 595 (1957) (Douglas,
J., dissenting).
123
See WRTL, 551 U.S. at 499 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment);
cf. McConnell, 540 U.S. at 326 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (“The
distinction, however, between independent expenditures for commenting on issues, on the one
hand, and supporting or opposing a candidate, on the other, has no First Amendment significance apart from Austin’s arbitrary line.”).
124
WRTL, 551 U.S. at 490 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment)
(noting that “at least Austin was limited to express advocacy”).
125
See also Daniel D. Polsby, Buckley v. Valeo: The Special Nature of Political Speech,
1976 SUP. CT. REV. 1, 20 (reading Buckley to enact the proposition that “[g]overnmental
abridgements that are aimed at enlarging the collective interest by suppressing individual
expression, even in the presence of massive documentation that the two interests are in hopeless
conflict, are unconstitutional”).
126
WRTL, 551 U.S. at 504–22 (Souter, J., dissenting).
127
See, e.g., Op. FEC 2004-31 (Sept. 10, 2004) (concluding that ads for a business with
same name as a federal candidate (the Russ Darrow Group, Inc.) are not electioneering communications); see also Richard Briffault, WRTL and Randall: The Roberts Court and the
Unsettling of Campaign Finance Law, 68 OHIO ST. L.J. 807, 820 (2007).
128
See Randall v. Sorrell, 548 U.S. 230 (2006) (revealing three Justices skeptical of or ready
to overrule Buckley’s treatment of contributions, and three Justices amenable to at least some
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In contrast, Chief Justice Roberts’s principal opinion suggests a substantive distinction between express advocacy and other forms of political speech, framing the
“functional equivalent” inquiry as whether the viewer has no choice but to view the
ad as an appeal for a vote.129 A striking passage explains, in response to the argument
that any ad that names a candidate before the election is the functional equivalent of
express advocacy, that “[i]ssue advocacy conveys information and educates. An issue
ad’s impact on an election, if it exists at all, will come only after the voters hear the
information and choose—uninvited by the ad—to factor it into their voting decisions.”130 This language—in particular the enigmatic distinction between, on the one
hand, “convey[ing] information and educat[ing],” and, on the other, “[ ]invit[ing]”
voters “to factor [that information] into their voting decisions”—suggests that something turns on the invitation to factor the conveyed information into voting decisions,
and that it is that something that may allow for the regulation of the speech.131 Here,
much as with contributions, it is only speech that can be seen to explicitly enter into
the actual election process that can be regulated.
In indicating that express advocacy and its functional equivalent may sufficiently
threaten the democratic process to justify regulation,132 but that the attempted regulation of the WRTL ad ignores its value as speech, the principal opinion draws a bright
line between express advocacy and other electoral advocacy. As a result, while the
opinion may overrule McConnell without saying so, it does not take on the Court’s
approval of regulation of corporate express advocacy in Austin. The preservation of
Austin raises questions about the basis for treating express advocacy differently than
other advocacy in the election setting.
As this discussion demonstrates, we can distill from the WRTL opinions three
distinct accounts of the express advocacy approach in establishing a regulatory zone
governing corporate electoral advocacy. The express advocacy line might be meaningless because all limitations on political ads (except perhaps disclosure) are constitutionally prohibited, as the McConnell dissents and Justice Scalia’s WRTL concurrence
restrictions on expenditures, either as not inconsistent with Buckley or because Buckley should
be overruled on this point).
129
In explaining why the ads are not the functional equivalent of express advocacy, the
principal opinion articulates the “indicia of express advocacy.” WRTL, 551 U.S. at 470. “The
ads do not mention an election, candidacy, political party, or challenger; and they do not take
a position on a candidate’s character, qualifications, or fitness for office.” Id. By contrast, the
“indicia” of issue advocacy are present when “[t]he ads focus on a legislative issue, take a
position on the issue, exhort the public to adopt that position, and urge the public to contact
public officials with respect to the matter.” Id.
130
Id.
131
Cf. Dorie E. Apollonio & Margaret A. Carne, Interest Group Advocacy and the Power
of “Magic Words,” 4 ELECTION L.J. 178, 178 (2005) (concluding that “the magic words test
made a valid distinction between different types of political spending”).
132
WRTL, 551 U.S. at 478–80.
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maintain.133 Alternatively, the express advocacy line might be irrelevant because regulation of any ads that can be seen as election-related and present the relevant harm is
permissible, as McConnell and Justice Souter’s WRTL dissent indicate. Finally, the
line might be significant because regulation can encompass only the solicitation of
votes (or its functional equivalent), as the pre-BCRA regime provided and the WRTL
principal opinion reinstates.134
In contrast to those who reject any regulation of political speech, both the WRTL
principal opinion and the dissent allow regulation of corporate advertising in the election setting in at least some circumstances: the divide between them is whether the
regulatory line can extend beyond the speech’s express intervention in the electoral
process. By enshrining the “express advocacy or its functional equivalent” line, the
principal opinion marks the border of regulable speech at the point of entry into the
electoral process through solicitation of the vote.135 Significantly, this approach shifts
the basis for the line from vagueness concerns to a substantive ideal based on the election itself. I turn in the next Part to the question of how this line fits with the interests
recognized as legitimate justifications for regulation.
III. GOVERNMENT INTERESTS IN REGULATING THE DEMOCRATIC PROCESS
Notwithstanding the robust protection of political speech, the Supreme Court has
identified interests pursuant to which Congress may regulate at least some forms of
political activity in the election setting. In this Part, I canvass the justifications the
Court has recognized for campaign finance regulation, emphasizing a heightened
emphasis on protection of representation as the basis for regulation, gestured toward
in McConnell and developed in Justice Souter’s WRTL dissent.136 I argue that the
varying approaches taken by Chief Justice Roberts and Justice Souter in their WRTL
opinions highlight the tensions shaping this area since Buckley, founded in efforts to
protect the broader representative process through regulation of the electoral process.
133

Even on this view, regulation might be permitted for speech within the immediate election setting that can affect the casting of votes. See infra notes 152–159 and accompanying text.
134
Justice Alito appears to adopt this position as well in his brief concurrence. See WRTL,
551 U.S. at 482–83 (Alito, J., concurring) (concluding that the statute “cannot constitutionally
ban any advertisement that may reasonably be interpreted as anything other than an appeal to
vote for or against a candidate”).
135
See id. at 481.
136
The Citizens United oral argument may indicate that this approach has come full circle,
with the government disavowing an equality-based reading of Austin, and relying on an anticorruption argument to justify regulation of corporate election speech. See Transcript of Oral
Argument at 45, 47–48, Citizens United v. FEC, No. 08-205, slip op. (U.S. Sup. Ct. Jan. 10,
2010) (suggesting that “Austin did not articulate what we believe to be the strongest compelling interest, which is the anticorruption interest” and stating that “[w]e do not rely at all on
Austin to the extent that anybody takes Austin to be suggesting anything about the equalization
of a speech market”).

2010] THE ELECTION PERIOD & REGULATION OF DEMOCRATIC PROCESS

561

Much as the divide over the placement of the regulatory line turned on whether
regulation must be limited to the electoral process itself, the question here concerns
whether protection of representation can extend beyond the election itself. It is this
tension between a vision of the electoral process as the exclusive setting for control
of the democratic process and an account of democracy that envisions a broader model
of citizen participation and a less tightly circumscribed sphere of regulatory involvement that gives rise to the divide in this area,137 a dynamic I illustrate across election
law in the next Part.
A. Regulatory Interests before WRTL
1. Preventing Corruption and its Derivative Interests
In Buckley, the Court determined that limitations on political contributions were
justified by Congress’s interest in preventing not only actual corruption but also the
appearance of corruption,138 explaining that “Congress could legitimately conclude
that the avoidance of the appearance of improper influence ‘is also critical . . . if confidence in the system of representative Government is not to be eroded to a disastrous
extent.’”139 The Court later articulated a limited account of corruption, explaining
that “[t]he hallmark of corruption is the financial quid pro quo: dollars for political
favors.”140 This framing served to limit the source of corruption (or its appearance)
to direct financial contributions to candidates, thereby constraining the invocation of
the corruption concern to justify other forms of regulation.141 Consistent with this
account of corruption, the Court denied states the possibility of limiting corporate
speech in referendum elections because the direct democracy context presents no
elected officials to corrupt,142 much as it had indicated in Buckley that self-funded
137

See supra note 34.
Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 26–28 (1976).
139
Id. at 27 (quoting CSC v. Letter Carriers, 413 U.S. 548, 565 (1973) (ellipsis in original)).
140
FEC v. Nat’l Conservative Political Action Comm., 470 U.S. 480, 497 (1985).
141
Undoubtedly, “corruption” is a contested concept. For discussions, see Thomas F. Burke,
The Concept of Corruption in Campaign Finance Law, 14 CONST. COMMENT 127 (1997);
Daniel H. Lowenstein, Political Bribery and the Intermediate Theory of Politics, 32 UCLA
L. REV. 784, 799–806 (1985) (discussing definitions of “corruption”); David A. Strauss,
Corruption, Equality, and Campaign Finance Reform, 94 COLUM. L. REV. 1369, 1370 (1994)
(arguing that “‘corruption’ in the system of campaign finance is a concern not for the reasons
that true corruption, such as conventional bribery, is a concern, but principally because of
inequality and the dangers of interest group politics”); Teachout, supra note 47, at 373–83
(providing an account of corruption as “the use of public forum to pursue private ends”).
142
First Nat’l Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 790 (1978) (“Referenda are held on
issues, not candidates for public office. The risk of corruption perceived in cases involving
candidate elections simply is not present in a popular vote on a public issue.” (internal citations
omitted)).
138
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candidates pose no risk of corruption.143 As these holdings indicate, the corruption concern, which the Court has suggested to be the only valid basis for campaign finance
regulation,144 is at heart a concern about representation.
The Court later identified “another reason for regulating corporate electoral
involvement” in FEC v. Beaumont, explaining that “recent cases have recognized that
restricting contributions by various organizations hedges against their use as conduits
for ‘circumvention of [valid] contribution limits.’”145 In particular, the Court expressed
concern about individuals affiliated with corporations funneling funds in excess of individual contribution limits.146 This circumvention framing is a second-order interest
in preventing violation of existing regulations that are designed to prevent corruption.
2. Austin’s Different Type of Corruption
The Court supplemented the Buckley model in Austin with a “different type of
corruption”: “the corrosive and distorting effects of immense aggregations of wealth
that are accumulated with the help of the corporate form and that have little or no correlation to the public’s support for the corporation’s political ideas.”147 The Court
explained that “the unique state-conferred corporate structure that facilitates the
amassing of large treasuries warrants the limit on independent expenditures. Corporate
wealth can unfairly influence elections when it is deployed in the form of independent
expenditures, just as it can when it assumes the guise of political contributions.”148
This framing appears to be a concern that concentrated wealth accumulated by means
of the state-provided corporate form will have a disproportionate or “distorting” effect
on the electoral process,149 what Richard Hasen has described as a “barometer equality
143

Buckley, 424 U.S. at 53.
See Nat’l Conservative Political Action Comm., 470 U.S. at 496–97 (“We held in Buckley
and reaffirmed in Citizens Against Rent Control that preventing corruption or the appearance
of corruption are the only legitimate and compelling government interests thus far identified
for restricting campaign finances.”). But see Davis v. FEC, 554 U.S. ____, 127 S. Ct. 2759,
2780 (2008) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (arguing that “[t]he Court is simply wrong when it suggests that the ‘governmental interest in eliminating corruption or the perception of corruption,’
is the sole governmental interest sufficient to support campaign finance regulations.” (internal
citation omitted)).
145
FEC v. Beaumont, 539 U.S. 146, 155 (2003) (quoting FEC v. Colo. Republican Fed.
Campaign Comm., 533 U.S. 431, 456 & n.18 (2001) (alteration in original)).
146
See id.
147
Austin v. Mich. Chamber of Commerce, 494 U.S. 652, 659–60 (1990).
148
Id. at 660. This framing was prefigured in MCFL, which had explained that “[r]egulation
of corporate political activity . . . has reflected concern not about use of the corporate form
per se, but about the potential for unfair deployment of wealth for political purposes.” FEC
v. Mass. Citizens for Life, Inc., 479 U.S. 238, 259 (1986).
149
There is some debate about how best to understand this form of corruption. See, e.g.,
Julian N. Eule, Promoting Speaker Diversity: Austin and Metro Broadcasting, 1990 SUP. CT.
REV. 105, 109–10 (“Nobody ought to be fooled. This [Austin corruption rationale] is simply
144
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rationale,” applied only to corporations.150 Commentators have emphasized Austin’s
intervention in the deliberative setting to protect voters, especially in light of the focus
on public support for the ideas expressed.151 On this account, Austin marks a departure
from that articulated in Buckley and its successor cases, not only in suggesting a sort
of equality rationale (notwithstanding the use of “corruption” language) for regulation
rather than the prevention of quid pro quo corruption, but also, correspondingly, in
emphasizing the electoral rather than representative process.
3. Protecting the Act of Voting
Less often discussed in this context (likely because it is not directed at campaign
“finance”) is a separate rationale for government regulation of speech in the electoral
setting: the interest in protecting the exercise of the ballot. In Burson v. Freeman, the
Court upheld a Tennessee law prohibiting campaigning within an area surrounding
the entrance to any polling place,152 because “some restricted zone is necessary in
a repackaging of the equalization goal.”); Post, supra note 17, at 1122–23 n.54 (describing
the Austin opinion as “opaque and difficult” and noting that “[o]n [Justice] Marshall’s account
the Michigan statute seems to be an effort to enforce a particular image of collective identity,
from which vantage the influence of corporate wealth can be excised as ‘corrosive and distorting.’”); Adam Winkler, Beyond Bellotti, 32 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 133, 155–62 (1998) [hereinafter Winkler, Beyond Bellotti] (arguing that the Austin corruption interest is based on
corporations’ improper use of other people’s money in the political process); Adam Winkler,
“Other People’s Money”: Corporations, Agency Costs, and Campaign Finance Law, 92
GEO. L.J. 871 (2004) [hereinafter Winkler, Other People’s Money] (developing history of this
concern). As noted, Solicitor General Kagan rejected an equalization account of Austin in the
Citizens United oral argument. See supra note 136.
150
RICHARD L. HASEN, THE SUPREME COURT AND ELECTION LAW 111–14 (2003) (arguing
that Austin “endorsed the barometer equality rationale” for campaign finance regulation).
151
See Baker, supra note 11, at 32 (identifying the Court’s concern as that “the corporate
treasury does not necessarily reflect political commitments of either consumers or even wealthy
owners” and “accept[ing] the legitimacy of the state’s concern that views expressed in the
electoral arena should reflect real people’s actual support”); David Cole, First Amendment
Antitrust: The End of Laissez-Faire in Campaign Finance, 9 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 236, 264
(1991) (arguing that Austin recognized that the interests invoked in campaign finance regulation serve the end of “correcting the unfair advantage of the corporate form in the political
marketplace of ideas”); Kathleen M. Sullivan, Political Money and Freedom of Speech, 30
U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 663, 676 (1997) (characterizing Austin as raising a “distortion” argument,
that “the unequal deployment of resources in electoral campaigns causes the wrong people
to get elected, distorting the true preferences of voters”).
152
See Burson v. Freeman, 504 U.S. 191 (1992). The Tennessee statute only applied to
campaign speech, i.e., express advocacy. Id. at 193–94 (statute applied to “the display of
campaign posters, signs or other campaign materials, distribution of campaign materials, and
solicitation of votes for or against any person or political party or position on a question”
(quoting TENN. CODE ANN. § 2-7-111(b) (Supp. 1991))); id. at 216 (Scalia, J., concurring in the
judgment) (noting that the statute “prohibits only electioneering speech”).
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order to serve the States’ compelling interests in preventing voter intimidation and
election fraud.”153 The Court would not second-guess the State’s fixing of the boundary
at 100 feet from the polling place, as “this Court never has held a State ‘to the burden
of demonstrating empirically the objective effects on political stability that [are] produced’ by the voting regulation in question.”154 In a significant footnote, the Court
explained that
[t]his modified ‘burden of proof’ does not apply to all cases in
which there is a conflict between First Amendment rights and a
State’s election process—instead, it applies only when the First
Amendment right threatens to interfere with the act of voting
itself, i.e., cases involving voter confusion from overcrowded
ballots, . . . or cases such as this one, in which the challenged
activity physically interferes with electors attempting to cast their
ballots.155
In short, where the state’s justification for the speech restriction is to protect the
act of ballot-casting—rather than the electoral process in some larger sense—restrictions on speech are not only permissible, but the state will not be held to evidentiary
requirements. Thus, because “the State, as recognized administrator of elections, has
asserted that the exercise of free speech rights conflicts with another fundamental
right, the right to cast a ballot in an election free from the taint of intimidation and
fraud,”156 the restriction on political speech was justified. Here, the right to free
speech can be limited to protect the exercise of the ballot.
Justice Kennedy made this point explicit, noting in his concurring opinion that
“there is a narrow area in which the First Amendment permits freedom of expression
to yield to the extent necessary for the accommodation of another constitutional
153

Id. at 206 (majority opinion).
Id. at 208–09 (quoting Munro v. Socialist Workers Party, 479 U.S. 189, 195 (1986)
(alteration in original)).
155
Id. at 209 n.11 (emphasis added).
156
Id. at 211. It is not self-evident that what was at issue in Burson was better characterized
as the individual right to vote rather than a state interest in a secure voting process. Professor
Karlan argues that in Purcell v. Gonzalez, 549 U.S. 1 (2006), in which the Court denied an
injunction against an Arizona voter identification law before the 2006 election after invoking
voters’ rights against dilution stemming from fraudulent voting, the Court “took a concern
that—if it were valid at all—almost certainly sounds in structural terms and shifted it toward
an individual account.” Pamela S. Karlan, New Beginnings and Dead Ends in the Law of
Democracy, 68 OHIO ST. L.J. 743, 764 (2007). Justice Stevens, who dissented in Burson,
rereads Burson in a later opinion for the Court to emphasize not voters’ rights but the state
interest in preventing last minute misinformation, along with intimidation and fraud, from
infecting the election process. See McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Comm’n, 514 U.S. 334, 352
n.16 (1995).
154
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right.”157 He applied that principle to the Burson case because “under the statute the
State acts to protect the integrity of the polling place where citizens exercise the right
to vote.”158 Justice Scalia went further in his separate opinion, arguing that the area
surrounding the polling place has never been a public forum and that reasonable
viewpoint-neutral regulations are therefore permissible.159 This approach enacts a
conception of election space, identifying the area in which voting occurs as physically
committed to the state, a spatial counterpart to the temporal election period model.
4. McConnell’s Interests in Preventing Undue Access and Promoting Democratic
Self-Government
In considering the challenge to BCRA, the Court had to determine whether the
state interests recognized in the earlier cases sufficed to justify the new restrictions
imposed on soft money and electioneering communications. While McConnell did
not formally identify new grounds for campaign finance regulation, commentators
have read the opinion to expand the permissible bases for regulation. Richard Pildes,
among others, argues that McConnell hinted at the “governmental effort to advance
participation in self-government itself” as a novel basis for regulation.160 This view,
associated with Justice Breyer’s “participatory self-government” approach,161 is based
on “governmental preservation of the essential premise of democracy itself.”162 Likewise, both Professor Pildes and Professor Briffault identify an expansion of the corruption rationale to include concerns about “special access” to representatives, as
“[b]y focusing on special access, McConnell reframed the corruption analysis from
the consideration of the impact of contributions on formal decisions to their effect
on the opportunity to influence government actions.”163
157

Burson, 504 U.S. at 213 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
Id. at 213–14.
159
Id. at 214–16 (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment) (concluding that “[b]ecause
restrictions on speech around polling places on election day are as venerable a part of the
American tradition as the secret ballot, [the statute] does not restrict speech in a traditional
public forum”).
160
Richard H. Pildes, Foreword, The Constitutionalization of Democratic Politics, 118
HARV. L. REV. 29, 149 (2004); Briffault, supra note 7, at 148 (arguing that “McConnell appears
to have placed the democracy-promoting features of campaign finance law at the heart of the
Court’s analysis”); Hasen, supra note 108, at 57–60 (reading the McConnell opinion as “a
sub silentio acceptance of the participatory self-government rationale”).
161
See BREYER, supra note 38, at 43–50; see also Nixon v. Shrink Mo. Gov’t PAC, 528
U.S. 377, 399–405 (2000) (Breyer, J., concurring).
162
Pildes, supra note 160, at 150.
163
Briffault, supra note 7, at 162–63; see also Daniel R. Ortiz, The Difference Two Justices
Make: FEC v. Wisconsin Right to Life, Inc. II and the Destabilization of Campaign Finance
Regulation, 1 ALB. GOV’T L. REV. 141, 148–50 (2008) (discussing McConnell’s recognition
of corruption concerns regarding improper influence, access, and circumvention); Pildes,
supra note 160, at 151–52.
158
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While these rationales provide a basis more expansive than the prevention of quid
pro quo corruption or its appearance for regulation of the broader democratic process,
they are developed in the section of the McConnell opinion reviewing BCRA’s restrictions on soft money contributions.164 In contrast, the Court upheld the electioneering communications restrictions based on the interests in preventing the electoral
distortion threatened by corporations as identified in Austin, and the circumvention
concern recognized in Beaumont,165 leaving open the question whether the newly recognized interests in promoting democracy and preventing undue influence apply to
the advertising restrictions as well.
It is worth pausing over McConnell’s invocation of the circumvention concern.
As noted, in concluding that the prohibition of corporate contributions applied to nonprofit advocacy corporations, Beaumont indicated that “recent cases have recognized
that restricting contributions by various organizations hedges against their use as conduits for ‘circumvention of [valid] contribution limits.’”166 McConnell altered this
phrasing slightly, shifting Beaumont’s “restricting contributions by various organizations” to “certain restrictions on corporate electoral involvement,” presumably in
order to expand the point beyond the contributions context.167 However, in modifying
only the first part of the sentence, the implication is that electioneering communications
serve not only as attempts to circumvent the ban on express advocacy, as the discourse
about “sham issue ads” suggests.168 Instead, McConnell addresses “circumvention of
valid contribution limits,” suggesting that the ads substitute for contributions, framing
a tight connection between campaign advocacy and contributions.
If “circumvention” means that private actors are taking advantage of a rule’s
underinclusiveness by acting in an unregulated manner in order to achieve the identical effect as the regulated conduct, the problem is not the circumvention per se, but
the creation of the relevant harm—a harm already found to justify regulation. In
164

See McConnell v. FEC, 540 U.S. 93, 144 (2003) (“Take away Congress’ authority to
regulate the appearance of undue influence and ‘the cynical assumption that large donors call
the tune could jeopardize the willingness of voters to take part in democratic governance.’”
(quoting Shrink Mo., 528 U.S. at 390)); id. at 137 (“Because the electoral process is the very
‘means through which a free society democratically translates political speech into concrete
governmental action,’ contribution limits, like other measures aimed at protecting the integrity
of the process, tangibly benefit public participation in political debate.” (quoting Shrink Mo.,
528 U.S. at 401 (Breyer, J., concurring))).
165
See id. at 205.
166
FEC v. Beaumont, 539 U.S. 146, 155 (2003) (quoting FEC v. Colo. Republican Fed.
Campaign Comm., 533 U.S. 431, 456 & n.18 (2001) (alteration in original)).
167
See McConnell, 540 U.S. at 205 (stating that “recent cases have recognized that certain
restrictions on corporate electoral involvement permissibly hedge against ‘circumvention of
[valid] contribution limits’” (quoting Beaumont, 539 U.S. at 155)).
168
See, e.g., Richard L. Hasen, Measuring Overbreadth: Using Empirical Evidence to
Determine the Constitutionality of Campaign Finance Laws Targeting Sham Issue Advocacy,
85 MINN. L. REV. 1773 (2001).
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seeking to prevent actors from creating the specified harm via unregulated channels,
a focus on circumvention targets that harm through another means.169 McConnell’s
invocation of Beaumont’s concern about circumvention of contribution limits thus
suggests a tentative step towards an acceptance in the corporate election ads context
of the same corruption concerns that underlie regulation of contributions.170
This move is significant because the Court had previously rejected the possibility
of justifying advertising restrictions on the basis of corruption as traditionally defined.
In Buckley, though allowing contribution limits based on corruption concerns, the
Court had emphasized that uncoordinated expenditures pose little or no threat of corruption and may even be counterproductive.171 Austin avoided this limitation by reframing the corruption concern as one of distortion.172 The McConnell suggestion,
later developed in Justice Souter’s WRTL dissent, presents a step away from the Austin
169

See Colo. Republican Fed. Campaign Comm., 533 U.S. at 456 (noting that “all Members
of the Court agree that circumvention is a valid theory of corruption; the remaining bone of
contention is evidentiary”).
170
The WRTL principal opinion reads Buckley to foreshadow such a move, noting that “[w]e
have suggested that this interest might also justify limits on electioneering expenditures because
it may be that, in some circumstances, ‘large independent expenditures pose the same dangers
of actual or apparent quid pro quo arrangements as do large contributions.’” FEC v. Wis. Right
to Life, Inc., 551 U.S. 449, 478 (2007) (quoting Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 45 (1976));
see also First Nat’l Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 788 n.26 (1978) (“Congress
might well be able to demonstrate the existence of a danger of real or apparent corruption in
independent expenditures by corporations to influence candidate elections.”).
The Court’s approach to electioneering communications is in marked contrast to its discussion of the coordination provisions in Section 214(a) of BCRA. See McConnell, 540 U.S.
at 219–23 (discussing plaintiffs’ challenge to “BCRA § 214’s Changes in FECA’s Provisions
Covering Coordinated Expenditures”). The Court there emphasized that limitations on truly
independent expenditures pose a significant burden on free speech “while ‘fail[ing] to serve
any substantial governmental interest in stemming the reality or appearance of corruption in
the electoral process.’” Id. at 221 (quoting Buckley, 424 U.S. at 47–48). There is some disconnect between this discussion and the treatment of electioneering communications a few
pages earlier, in which the Court had acknowledged that such ads may serve to circumvent
contribution limits and are regulable on that basis, see id. at 205, as well as with Justice
Stevens’s (the co-author of the McConnell opinion) Austin concurrence, which focused on
“the fact, or the appearance, of quid pro quo relationships” as a basis for regulating corporate
electioneering expenditures, Austin v. Mich. Chamber of Commerce, 494 U.S. 652, 678 (1990)
(Stevens, J., concurring); see also infra note 173.
This divide suggests that the Court viewed corporate expenditures as more likely to be
influence-securing than expenditures by individuals, perhaps because they are more likely to
be helpful even if not coordinated. Whatever the rationale, the different approaches highlight
again the distinct treatment of the corporation in campaign finance law.
171
See Buckley, 424 U.S. at 47 (“Unlike contributions, such independent expenditures
may well provide little assistance to the candidate’s campaign and indeed may prove counterproductive.”).
172
See supra notes 147–151 and accompanying text.
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approach and gestures toward the dissolution of Buckley’s line between contributions
and expenditures, at least in the corporate setting. Significantly, Justice Stevens, the
co-author of the McConnell majority opinion, concurred separately in Austin, challenging the use of a line between contributions and expenditures in the corporate context and justifying the Michigan ad restrictions based on the threat or the appearance
of corruption.173
This discussion reveals the various interests the Court has invoked in justifying
campaign speech regulations: 1) corruption and its derivative interests in the appearance of corruption and circumvention of campaign finance restrictions designed to
prevent corruption; 2) Austin’s “different type of corruption” involving the distorting
character of corporate political participation; 3) protecting the act of ballot-casting;
4) the participatory self-government ideal; and 5) concerns about special access and
the ability to influence elected officials. We can also add 6) the interest in “providing
the electorate with information” as recognized by the Court in the disclosure context.174 These varied justifications reflect the distinct interests in protecting both the
electoral and the representative processes.
B. Articulating Regulatory Interests in WRTL
The WRTL opinions highlight the tensions surrounding the identification of
permissible regulatory interests and their connection to permissible restrictions. I
focus here on the principal opinion and Justice Souter’s dissent, both of which
depart from McConnell’s treatment of the state interests.175 I discuss here how each
engages the existing precedent and the questions raised in doing so.
Consistent with its general departure from McConnell, the WRTL principal
opinion rejects the extension of any interests justifying regulation beyond their
framing in the earlier cases.176 In barring regulation of the WRTL ad, Chief Justice
Roberts explains that the interest in preventing quid pro quo corruption and the
Austin distortion concern apply only to express advocacy and its functional equivalent, which on his definition the WRTL ad is not.177 He further states that the anticircumvention “prophylaxis-upon-prophylaxis approach” is not compatible with strict
scrutiny and that because “[i]ssue ads like WRTL’s are by no means equivalent to
contributions, . . . the quid-pro-quo corruption interest cannot justify regulating
173

See Austin, 494 U.S. at 678 (Stevens, J., concurring) (“In my opinion the distinction
between individual expenditures and individual contributions that the Court identified in
Buckley v. Valeo, should have little, if any, weight in reviewing corporate participation in
candidate elections.” (internal citation omitted)).
174
McConnell, 540 U.S. at 196.
175
As noted, Justice Scalia’s separate opinion largely rejects the regulation of electoral
advocacy for any reason.
176
See FEC v. Wis. Right to Life, Inc., 551 U.S. 449, 477–80 (2007).
177
See id. at 479–81.
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them.”178 To the extent regulation is based on preventing circumvention, the principal opinion notes there must be a limiting point, which it draws at the election line.179
In rejecting the possibility of these government interests justifying regulation,
the principal opinion demonstrates that it is the characterization of the speech that is
doing the work. Likewise, though the principal opinion does not mention Burson,
the emphasis on the distinction between political speech and campaign speech tracks
that opinion’s distinction between the state’s power to regulate the exercise of the vote
but not the deliberative process shaping the exercise of the vote.180 Further, nothing
in the principal opinion indicates that it took seriously concerns about special access
or self-government as a basis for regulation.181 In sum, the principal opinion relies
primarily on a framing dependent on the identification of the speech as a trigger for
the recognized regulatory interests.
Rather than follow McConnell in relying primarily on Austin and its emphasis on
corporate distortion of the electoral process, Justice Souter’s WRTL dissent reads the
BCRA restrictions to emphasize protection of the representative relationship. The
first section of the opinion is dedicated to demonstrating that:
Campaign finance reform has been a series of reactions to documented threats to electoral integrity obvious to any voter, posed
by large sums of money from corporate or union treasuries, with
no redolence of “grassroots” about them. Neither Congress’s decisions nor our own have understood the corrupting influence of
money in politics as being limited to outright bribery or discrete
quid pro quo; campaign finance reform has instead consistently
focused on the more pervasive distortion of electoral institutions
by concentrated wealth, on the special access and guaranteed favor
that sap the representative integrity of American government and
defy public confidence in its institutions. From early in the 20th
century through the decision in McConnell, we have acknowledged that the value of democratic integrity justifies a realistic
response when corporations and labor organizations commit the
concentrated moneys in their treasuries to electioneering.182
178

Id. at 478–79.
See id.
180
See supra note 155 and accompanying text.
181
Professor Briffault argues that a vision of “campaign finance law as the balancing of
competing democratic values, with effectiveness in preventing corruption and promoting
political integrity counting as much as freedom of political participation, largely drops out”
of the WRTL opinion, which sees the case as about political speech alone. Briffault, supra note
118, at 127–29.
182
WRTL, 551 U.S. at 522 (Souter, J., dissenting).
179
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The emphasis here is on political institutions and the “integrity” of the American
government.183 In its focus on money (the word appears three times in these three sentences alone, along with a reference to “wealth”) and the absence of any reference to
speech, this paragraph treats corporate electioneering expenditures as the functional
equivalent of corporate campaign contributions. Under Buckley, of course, contributions are regulated because of their potentially corrupting effects on representatives
and the appearance of such corruption.184 Like McConnell’s treatment of the restrictions on soft money contributions,185 Justice Souter emphasizes concern about the
special access and guaranteed favor that donors—or those who run ads—receive.186
This framing shapes a vision of the “corruption” arising from electioneering communications as akin to that stemming from contributions.
In preferring a focus on representation to Austin’s emphasis on the electoral
process, the argument recalls Buckley but is in some tension with that opinion. While
the Buckley Court had emphasized that uncoordinated expenditures pose little threat
of corruption,187 the electioneering communications restrictions are not limited to
coordinated activity. This conflict stems in part from the different premises underlying regulation: if, following McConnell, there is a valid state interest in preventing
not only quid pro quo corruption but undue influence as well, Buckley’s distinction
between coordinated and uncoordinated expenditures is blurred. While it is logical
that uncoordinated quid pro quo deals are unlikely, uncoordinated expenditures,
at least by corporations, might still buy access and be regulable under an expanded
vision of corruption.188
In treating these ads as quasi-contributions, with the concerns that justify regulating contributions, Justice Souter challenges Buckley’s line between contributions
183

See id. at 507 (“Devoting concentrations of money in self-interested hands to the support
of political campaigning therefore threatens the capacity of this democracy to represent its
constituents and the confidence of its citizens in their capacity to govern themselves.”); id.
at 507–08 (“Before the turn of the last century, as now, it was obvious that the purchase of
influence and the cynicism of voters threaten the integrity and stability of democratic government, each derived from the responsiveness of its law to the interests of citizens and their confidence in that focus.”); id. at 518 (emphasizing that “[the ads] were worth the money of those
who ultimately paid for them” in obtaining access to legislators).
184
See Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 26–28 (1976).
185
See supra notes 160–164 and accompanying text.
186
See WRTL, 551 U.S. at 522 (Souter, J., dissenting); id. at 506 (“What the high-dollar
pragmatists of either variety get is special access to the officials they help elect, and with it
a disproportionate influence on those in power.” (citing McConnell, 540 U.S. at 130–31)).
187
See supra note 171 and accompanying text. Justice Scalia makes a similar point. WRTL,
551 U.S. at 490 n.4 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment) (“No one
seriously believes that independent expenditures could possibly give rise to quid-pro-quo
corruption without being subject to regulation as coordinated expenditures.”).
188
See supra note 170 (noting that Buckley, and Bellotti in the corporate context specifically,
had suggested that this presumption about uncoordinated expenditures could be rebutted).
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and expenditures.189 Buckley had distinguished these on both sides of the constitutional balance, finding a greater speech interest in expenditures than in contributions190
and, as discussed, a lesser state interest in regulating expenditures than in regulating
contributions.191 On the Buckley account, the value of a contribution is the symbolic
expression for the speaker, with little value for listeners (none, possibly, without mandatory disclosure).192
Despite arguing that McConnell governs,193 Justice Souter steps back from that
opinion, which had invoked Austin and the circumvention concern as the bases for
regulating electioneering communications.194 By deemphasizing the focus on equality
in the electoral process in favor of the threat of corporate money to the representative
process, and in analogizing the advertisements to contributions, the WRTL dissent
does not follow the Austin voter-focused approach, but confronts Buckley on its own
representational integrity terms, thereby preferring Justice Stevens’s Austin concurrence to Justice Marshall’s opinion for the Court. The result is that Chief Justice
Roberts’s WRTL principal opinion is left as the heir to Austin, raising doubts as to
its viability.195
Justice Souter’s repeated concern for public confidence in the democratic
process196 recalls not only Buckley’s validation of concern about the appearance of
189

Justice Souter questions the distinction more explicitly at the end of the opinion. See
WRTL, 551 U.S. at 536 (noting that “it may be that today’s departure from precedent will drive
further reexamination of the constitutional analysis: of the distinction between contributions
and expenditures, or the relation between spending and speech, which have given structure
to our thinking since Buckley itself was decided”).
190
See Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 20–21 (1976) (“By contrast with a limitation upon
expenditures for political expression, a limitation upon the amount that any one person or group
may contribute to a candidate or political committee entails only a marginal restriction upon
the contributor’s ability to engage in free communication.”).
191
See supra note 171 and accompanying text.
192
Buckley, 424 U.S. at 21 (describing contributions as “a general expression of support
for the candidate and his views” that “does not communicate the underlying basis for the
support” and noting that “the expression rests solely on the undifferentiated, symbolic act of
contributing”).
193
See WRTL, 551 U.S. at 525 (Souter, J., dissenting) (concluding that “it is beyond all
reasonable debate that the ads are constitutionally subject to regulation under McConnell”).
194
Justice Souter does invoke a circumvention concern, though he does not cite Beaumont
for this point or acknowledge McConnell’s reliance upon it. See id. at 536 (“After today, the
ban on contributions by corporations and unions and the limitation on their corrosive spending
when they enter the political arena are open to easy circumvention . . . .”).
195
Cf Citizens United v. FEC, No. 08-205, slip op. (U.S. Sup. Ct. Jan. 21, 2010) (overruling Austin).
196
See WRTL, 551 U.S. at 522 (explaining that “[c]ampaign finance reform has . . . consistently focused on the more pervasive distortion of electoral institutions by concentrated wealth,
on the special access and guaranteed favor that sap the representative integrity of American
government and defy public confidence in its institutions”); id. at 507 (“Devoting concentrations of money in self-interested hands to the support of political campaigning therefore
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corruption, but also Justice Breyer’s argument for protection of the participatory selfgovernment ideal.197 Justice Souter notes that politicians are unlikely to care whether
helpful ads include magic words or their functional equivalents,198 and indicates that
the regulatory concern is triggered when viewers could identify the ad as intended to
affect the outcome of the election.199 The notion that it is voters’ understanding of
the ad that guides the constitutionality of regulation200 indicates that it is the ad itself
that threatens to undermine public confidence, rather than any later legislative action
traceable to gratitude for the ad. This public confidence framing suggests voters see
certain ads as intended to obtain influence, whether by helping the candidate directly
or by attacking the opponent. On this account, the BCRA scheme is designed to protect the representative process, not only by preventing corporate advertisers from obtaining special access, but also by defending against the harm to public confidence
that follows from the saturation of the airwaves by ads read by voters as bids for
influence and the cynicism about the electoral process such ads can engender.
Thus, whereas the WRTL principal opinion returns to Buckley’s regulatory line
in reinstituting an express advocacy standard to ensure the regulation only of
threatens the capacity of this democracy to represent its constituents and the confidence of
its citizens in their capacity to govern themselves.”); id. at 507–08 (“Before the turn of the
last century, as now, it was obvious that the purchase of influence and the cynicism of voters
threaten the integrity and stability of democratic government, each derived from the responsiveness of its law to the interests of citizens and their confidence in that focus.”); id. at 504
(describing “the demand for campaign money in huge amounts from large contributors, whose
power has produced a cynical electorate”).
197
See supra notes 38, 160–161 and accompanying text. Professor Hasen characterizes
Justice Souter’s WRTL dissent as “demonstrat[ing] an emerging egalitarian view of campaign
finance law,” which he views as similar to Justice Breyer’s “participatory self-government”
approach. Richard L. Hasen, Justice Souter: Campaign Finance Law’s Emerging Egalitarian,
1 ALB. GOV’T L. REV. 169, 171, 184–87 (2008).
198
WRTL, 551 U.S. at 518 (Souter, J., dissenting) (“[The ads] were worth the money of
those who ultimately paid for them. According to one former Senator, “‘Members will . . . be
favorably disposed to those who finance’” interest groups that run “‘issue ads’” when those
financiers “‘later seek access to discuss pending legislation.’” (quoting McConnell v. FEC,
251 F. Supp. 2d 176, 556 (D.D.C. 2003) (Kollar-Kotelly, J.))); see also Overton, supra note 95,
at 701 (“There is no good reason to believe that express words of advocacy like ‘vote for’ or
‘vote against’ always or even usually threaten these state interests [in preventing corruption
and the appearance of corruption] more than communications that do not contain such words.”).
199
Justice Souter explains that “[w]hile we left open the possibility of a ‘genuine’ or ‘pure’
issue ad that might not be open to regulation under § 203, we meant that an issue ad without
campaign advocacy could escape the restriction.” WRTL, 551 U.S. at 526 (Souter, J., dissenting) (internal citation omitted). Further, “[t]he implication of the adjectives ‘genuine’ and
‘pure’ is unmistakable: if an ad is reasonably understood as going beyond a discussion of issues
(that is, if it can be understood as electoral advocacy), then by definition it is not ‘genuine’
or ‘pure.’” Id.
200
See id. at 525 (“Any alert voters who heard or saw WRTL’s ads would have understood
that WRTL was telling them that the Senator’s position on the filibusters should be grounds
to vote against him.”).
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“unambiguously campaign related” advertisements, the dissent returns to Buckley’s
focus on protecting the representative process in justifying an electioneering communications standard, an emphasis consistent with the election period model. It is
this continuing tension, internalized in Buckley and exemplified by WRTL, between
a tight focus on elections and a perspective that takes account of the larger democratic
process that underlies debates surrounding the regulatory line and implicates broader
questions about the relationship between political speech and the electoral process.
I turn to those questions in the next Part.
IV. POLITICAL SPEECH AND THE VOTE
Citizen participation in the democratic process takes two primary forms: political
deliberation and the exercise of the vote, protected respectively by the right of free
speech and the right to vote. These rights have received different treatment by courts.
The right of free political speech has largely been treated as sacrosanct; in the words
of Justice Scalia, “[i]t is perhaps [the Court’s] most important constitutional task to
ensure freedom of political speech.”201 At the same time, as Justice Scalia has elsewhere noted, “no justification for regulation [of speech] is more compelling than protection of the electoral process.”202 In this Part, I demonstrate that the difficulties in
drawing the regulatory line in the electoral advocacy setting reflect a broader tension,
appearing throughout election law, between protecting the vote through regulation
and protecting political speech by prohibiting regulation.
The elections/politics line exemplifies the differing treatment of these forms of
participation, allowing some regulation of speech closely tied to the vote while protecting other political speech against state involvement. The WRTL principal opinion
re-inscribed this line after its elision in McConnell, freeing it from its roots in the
vagueness doctrine in favor of a substantive foundation in the type of political speech
that can be subject to regulation. In doing so, the opinion limits state regulation to
the vote, either protecting the casting of ballots, as in Burson, or regulating activity
that enters into the electoral process, as with contribution limits or corporate express
advocacy—in either case requiring a direct connection to the election itself. On this
model, restricting political speech that is not unambiguously election-related lacks the
tight connection to the vote that has traditionally allowed for state intervention in this
context. Ultimately, this distinction reduces the democratic process to the vote itself.
A. Regulation of the Vote and Political Speech
The Court has explained that
[c]ommon sense, as well as constitutional law, compels the conclusion that government must play an active role in structuring
201
202

Id. at 503 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).
McIntyre v. Ohio Election Comm’n, 514 U.S. 334, 379 (1995) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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elections; “as a practical matter, there must be a substantial regulation of elections if they are to be fair and honest and if some
sort of order, rather than chaos, is to accompany the democratic
processes.”203
The Burson Court likewise made clear the state’s authority to limit political speech
in order to protect the exercise of the ballot.204 On these views, invoking an interest
in protecting the exercise of the vote can accord the state deference to regulate even
political speech.
This move is consistent with other decisions addressing the electoral process.205
In Burdick v. Takushi, the Court upheld a Hawaii law prohibiting write-in votes,206
noting that the purpose of elections is to choose a winner.207 The Court indicated that
“to subject every voting regulation to strict scrutiny and to require that the regulation
be narrowly tailored to advance a compelling state interest, as petitioner suggests,
would tie the hands of States seeking to assure that elections are operated equitably
and efficiently.”208 Likewise, in Crawford v. Marion County Election Board, the recent challenge to Indiana’s voter identification requirement, the Court held that the
state’s interests in preventing voter fraud and maintaining public confidence in the
electoral process justified, at least on a facial challenge, restrictions on the ballot that
may burden some voters.209 In ballot access cases, the Court has permitted state
restrictions that make it difficult for third parties to get on the ballot as a means of
protecting against voter confusion potentially caused by ballot overcrowding.210 The
common theme is that to avoid chaos, to protect the ability of voters to cast a ballot
free of intimidation, confusion, and fraud, and to run elections efficiently, fairly, and
reliably, the state can adopt a wide array of regulations that limit the right to vote or
other political rights, including the right to free speech.
In contrast to the Court’s broad approval of state regulation of the voting process,
regulation of political speech aimed at protecting the broader deliberative process
has been largely disapproved. In Mills v. Alabama, which struck down a state law
203

Burdick v. Takushi, 504 U.S. 428, 433 (1992) (quoting Storer v. Brown, 415 U.S. 724,
730 (1974)); see also Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 13 (1976) (noting that “[t]he constitutional power of Congress to regulate federal elections is well established”).
204
See supra notes 152–159 and accompanying text.
205
See Baker, supra note 11, at 24–33 (discussing ways in which the state may regulate
expression in the election context); Briffault, supra note 2, at 1766–71 (same).
206
Burdick, 504 U.S. at 430.
207
Id. at 438 (quoting Storer, 415 U.S. at 735).
208
Id. at 433.
209
See 553 U.S. 181, 128 S. Ct. 1610 (2008).
210
See, e.g., Munro v. Socialist Workers Party, 479 U.S. 189, 193–94 (1986) (recognizing
the “important state interest” in “avoiding confusion, deception, and even frustration of the
democratic process at the general election” (quoting Jenness v. Fortson, 403 U.S. 431, 442
(1971))).
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prohibiting newspaper editorial endorsements of candidates the day before the election, the Court rejected the state interest in protecting the public “‘from confusive lastminute charges and countercharges and the distribution of propaganda in an effort
to influence voters on an election day,’” because it is on election day that campaigning “can be most effective.”211 The Burson majority’s distinguishing of Mills based
on a distinction between the broader deliberative process and the direct exercise of
the ballot further demonstrates the varying treatment of the voting and deliberative
processes.212 This point is sharpened by the Court’s recent decision in a challenge to
Washington’s “blanket primary,” in which it acknowledged concerns about voter
confusion, involving the actual design of the ballot itself.213
Consistent with the view that the primary purpose of the First Amendment is
protection of political speech, the Court has blocked a number of attempts at state
regulation of such speech. In striking down a California ban on party endorsements,
the Court explained that “[c]ertainly the State has a legitimate interest in fostering an
informed electorate. However, ‘[a] State’s claim that it is enhancing the ability of its
citizenry to make wise decisions by restricting the flow of information to them must
be viewed with some skepticism.’”214 The Court likewise found unconstitutional an
Ohio ban on anonymous campaign speech upon concluding that no legitimate state
interest justified regulation of such speech.215 The Court’s skepticism about regulation
of the speech of judicial candidates despite the distinct judicial role and concerns about
prejudice presents a similar approach,216 as do other cases emphasizing the importance
of political speech despite asserted state interests in regulation.217
B. Framing these Rights in Election Speech Cases
This discussion highlights important differences between the right to free speech
and the right to vote. The right to free speech reflects a norm of liberty and takes the
211

384 U.S. 214, 219–20 (1966) (quoting the Alabama Supreme Court’s decision, State
v. Mills, 278 Ala. 188, 195–96 (1965)).
212
See Burson v. Freeman, 504 U.S. 191, 209 n.11 (1992).
213
Wash. State Grange v. Wash. State Republican Party, 552 U.S. 442, 454–57 (2008).
214
Eu v. S.F. County Democratic Cent. Comm., 489 U.S. 214, 228–29 (1989) (quoting
Tashjian v. Republican Party, 479 U.S. 208, 221 (1986) (internal citations omitted)).
215
McIntyre v. Ohio Election Comm’n, 514 U.S. 334, 357 (1995) (“Ohio has not shown that
its interest in preventing the misuse of anonymous election-related speech justifies a prohibition of all uses of that speech.”).
216
See, e.g., Republican Party of Minn. v. White, 536 U.S. 765 (2002) (striking down state
prohibition on judicial candidates announcing their views on “disputed legal or political issues”).
217
See, e.g., Buckley v. Am. Const. Law Found., 525 U.S. 182 (1999) (striking down various
requirements imposed by state on initiative petition circulators under the First Amendment);
Meyer v. Grant, 486 U.S. 414 (1988) (finding unconstitutional a state prohibition on paid petition
circulators); Brown v. Hartlage, 456 U.S. 45 (1982) (finding Kentucky Corrupt Practices Act
unconstitutional as applied to candidate’s public promise to serve in office at reduced salary).
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form of a negative right, protecting against interference by the state,218 while the right
to vote is premised on equality and functions as a procedural right that cannot be separated from the rules that construct the vote itself.219 Where the right to free speech
allows the individual to engage in primary conduct free from government restriction,
the right to vote entitles her to participate on an equal basis in a government-run
process, leaving no way to avoid state involvement. The state is thus given broad
deference to regulate the vote to protect against threats from private actors and little
authority to regulate speech to protect the deliberative process.
The differing treatment of such threats reflects this divide. The perceived danger
to the vote posed by private actors is evident in Burson’s extended description of the
sketchy activity surrounding elections in the nineteenth century,220 as well as in the
judicial credulity about voter fraud in the recent voter identification cases221 and the
Court’s emphasis on protecting against “chaos” in the voting process in the ballot
access cases.222 Indeed, Professor Pildes has suggested that the Court often sides with
those in the democratic cultural clash who are concerned about disorder and stability
rather than those who embrace the tumult.223 In articulating a “fundamental right . . .
to cast a ballot in an election free from the taint of intimidation and fraud,”224 the Court
defines regulation into the right and gives the state substantial deference to limit political rights in the name of protecting them. In contrast, in the political speech context,
the threat from the state is seen as the more worrisome.225 Though commentators
218

See Sullivan, supra note 151, at 667 (discussing this point).
See Michael C. Dorf, Facial Challenges to State and Federal Statutes, 46 STAN. L.
REV. 235, 265–66 (1994) (identifying the right to vote as a procedural right, a “right that can
be exercised only in a government-created forum,” as distinct from rights to engage in primary
conduct like the right to free speech).
220
See Burson v. Freeman, 504 U.S. 191, 200–05 (1992). For a colorful description of
nineteenth-century voting, see Jill Lepore, Rock, Paper, Scissors: How We Used To Vote, NEW
YORKER, Oct. 13, 2008, at 90 (noting, among other things, that “[i]n the middle decades of the
nineteenth century, eighty-nine Americans were killed at the polls during Election Day riots”).
221
See, e.g., Crawford v. Marion County Election Bd., 553 U.S. 181, 128 S. Ct. 1610, 1619
(2008) (concluding that “not only is the risk of voter fraud real but that it could affect the outcome of a close election” based on citations to Boss Tweed and evidence of one fraudulent
voter in 2004 Washington gubernatorial election).
222
See, e.g., Storer v. Brown, 415 U.S. 724, 730 (1974).
223
See Richard H. Pildes, Democracy and Disorder, 68 U. CHI. L. REV. 695, 714 (2001)
(“Whether democracy requires order, stability, and channeled, constrained forms of engagement, or whether it requires and even celebrates relatively wide-open competition that may
appear tumultuous, partisan, or worse, has long been a struggle in democratic thought and
practice (indeed, historically it was one of the defining set of oppositions in arguments about
the desirability of democracy itself).”); cf. Burson, 504 U.S. at 228 (Stevens, J., dissenting)
(“The hubbub of campaign workers outside a polling place may be a nuisance, but it is also
the sound of a vibrant democracy.”).
224
Burson, 504 U.S. at 211.
225
See, e.g., Frederick Schauer, The Second-Best First Amendment, 31 WM. & MARY L.
219
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have argued that in the modern environment state regulation can be consistent with
First Amendment values,226 the doctrine largely remains opposed to state regulation.
On this account, the state regulates elections as a formalized process that demands
administration in order to achieve reliable, efficient, and democratic results, while
public political deliberation is not treated as a “process” reaching a binding result and
need not be administered, precluding state involvement. In the context of political
speech, chaos is treated as a goal rather than something to be avoided at all costs.227
We might debate whether chaos currently reigns with regard to political speech in the
election setting in view of the nature of the media structure and the power of some
private actors in that setting. Still, the longstanding (and historically justified) fear
of state regulation of political speech has created a strong presumption against such
restrictions. In short, current doctrine generally treats the vote as so important that
the state must regulate it, and political speech as so important that the state cannot
regulate it.
This divide gives rise to a number of concerns on both sides of the line. Whatever
the case historically, it is far from obvious that the primary threat to the vote today is
the actions of private actors. While there is some evidence of fraud by private actors
in recent years, particularly in the absentee ballot context,228 these practices are episodic and nothing like those described in such detail in Burson, which seared the
Court’s imagination.229 The chaos at issue in elections nowadays is often that created
by state actors, either by difficulties in administering elections or by state regulations
that prevent individuals from voting.230 The controversy over voter identification
REV. 1, 2 (1989) (“Not only the first amendment, but also the very idea of a principle of
freedom of speech, is an embodiment of a risk-averse distrust of decisionmakers.”).
226
See, e.g., Cole, supra note 151, at 266 (“Where the laissez-faire model had focused
almost exclusively on the threats to free expression posed by public actors, the First Amendment
antitrust model recognized that a robust and wide-open debate could also be undermined by
powerful private actors.”); Owen M. Fiss, Free Speech and Social Structure, 71 IOWA L. REV.
1405, 1415–16 (1986) (arguing that “contemporary social structure is as much an enemy of
free speech as is the policeman” and that “[w]hen the state acts to enhance the quality of public
debate, we should recognize its actions as consistent with the first amendment”); Schauer &
Pildes, supra note 15, at 1806 (questioning the notion that First Amendment values “are
better served by treating government intervention as the unqualified enemy than by allowing
the state a limited role in fostering the proliferation of voices in the public sphere or of increasing the importance of message and effort by decreasing the importance of wealth”).
227
See New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270 (1964) (discussing the “profound national commitment to the principle that debate on public issues should be uninhibited,
robust, and wide-open”).
228
See Richard L. Hasen, The Untimely Death of Bush v. Gore, 60 STAN. L. REV. 1, 22
(2007) (“There is widespread consensus among those who study voter fraud that the greatest
potential for fraud—and certainly the most reported cases of such fraud—involve absentee
ballots that are cast outside the presence of election officials.”).
229
See Burson, 504 U.S. at 200–07.
230
See Hasen, supra note 228, at 15–28 (discussing the “continued lack of confidence of
voters in the competence of election officials”).
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requirements likewise raises concerns that partisan actors can potentially manipulate the mechanics of electoral administration to achieve partisan ends by excluding
voters.231 Focusing concerns about democratic control on the vote itself may thus
yield excessive deference to state regulation in that setting, in contrast to the distrust
of regulation designed to protect effective representation.
In sum, the Court’s approach has the effect of reducing the democratic process
to the vote itself and distinguishing it sharply from the surrounding spheres of deliberation and representation, demanding state intervention in the former and largely prohibiting it in the latter. As an alternative, acknowledging the continuing process of
democratic activity and recognizing that the dangers from the state and private actors
flow unabated in each sphere and that values of equality and liberty might be maximized in both allows for an election period that bridges the two and accommodates
settings in which values of both elections and politics are at issue.
V. REGULATING CORPORATE POLITICAL ADVERTISING IN THE ELECTION PERIOD
In this Part, I examine the context of corporate political advocacy presented by
BCRA and the WRTL case as a proving ground for the election period model. The
corporate political speech context has been characterized by a focus on the speech
rather than the speaker, a framing that emphasizes the structural protection of the electoral process rather than questions of individual rights. This framing in turn marks
the corporate political advocacy setting as fitting for the election period approach,
especially in light of the corresponding recognition of a concern for public confidence
in the electoral process. While Citizens United sharply limits Congress’s authority
to regulate corporate political speech, this discussion can provide guidance for any
targeted regulation enacted in the future. In short, protecting speech because of a
structural interest in its value for democratic governance will presume an account of
the democratic process, and that account should include ideals of representation as
well as the vote.
A. Corporate Election Advertising and the First Amendment
The BCRA advertising restrictions follow, both historically and conceptually,
from general limits on corporate money in elections which have existed at the federal
level for over one hundred years.232 This history speaks to a continuing sense that
231

See id. at 5 (noting “the possibility that some laws, most prominently new laws requiring
voters to show identification at the polls, are being enacted for partisan advantage rather than
to remedy any real problem”).
232
See supra note 183 and accompanying text. Some states restricted corporate contributions
even before. See ROBERT E. MUTCH, CAMPAIGNS, CONGRESS, AND COURTS: THE MAKING OF
FEDERAL CAMPAIGN FINANCE LAW xvii (1988) (noting that “[i]n 1897 four states—Nebraska,
Missouri, Tennessee, and Florida . . . —prohibited corporation political contributions, in reaction
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something about corporations threatens the political process and must be monitored
or limited and, though it cannot itself justify campaign finance regulation or any particular limitation on corporate participation, forces us to grapple with where the appropriate line can be drawn, reflecting constitutional commitments to free speech and to
an effective democratic process.233 I do not seek to justify restrictions on corporate
political activity from first principles, but to highlight, in light of the longstanding
belief that such restrictions are necessary, that the structure of corporate speech
protection lends itself to an election period model.
A number of reasons for limitations on corporate political participation appear
in the literature: corporate speech is not the speech of any human speaker234 or only
reflects the investment interests of shareholders,235 corporations are uniquely skilled
at rent-seeking,236 their state-created structure allows corporations to accumulate wellstocked coffers which they can deploy in the political process,237 corporations fund
against Mark Hanna’s successful solicitation of corporate support for William McKinley” and
noting enactment of state-level disclosure laws in the 1890s as well (citations omitted)).
233
Cf. McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Comm’n, 514 U.S. 334, 375 (1995) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“A governmental practice that has become general throughout the United States, and
particularly one that has the validation of long, accepted usage, bears a strong presumption
of constitutionality.”).
234
See Tom Bennigson, Nike Revisited: Can Commercial Corporations Engage in
Non-Commercial Speech?, 39 CONN. L. REV. 379, 384 (2006) (noting that “no speaker interests are at stake in corporate speech: it is not the speech of shareholders, officers or directors,
or any other constituency” in arguing that all corporate speech should be treated as commercial speech); Meir Dan-Cohen, Freedoms of Collective Speech: A Theory of Protected
Communications by Organizations, Communities, and the State, 79 CAL. L. REV. 1229,
1244–48, 1254 (1991) (characterizing business corporations as “utilitarian organizations” and
arguing that “the speech of utilitarian organizations is devoid of expressive value and its protection depends exclusively on the listeners’ interests served by it”); Thomas W. Joo, The
Modern Corporation and Campaign Finance: Incorporating Corporate Governance Analysis
into First Amendment Jurisprudence, 79 WASH. U. L.Q. 1, 6 (2001) (arguing that “[b]ecause
corporate election-related spending decisions are not made in consultation with a corporation’s
shareholders or other constituents, such spending does not constitute individual expression”
and thus “does not deserve the same First Amendment protection enjoyed by individual
political spending”).
235
See Samuel Issacharoff & Daniel R. Ortiz, Governing Through Intermediaries, 85 VA.
L. REV. 1627, 1654–56 (1999) (discussing problems of “fractionated superagency”).
236
See, e.g., Robert H. Sitkoff, Corporate Political Speech, Political Extortion, and the
Competition for Corporate Charters, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 1103, 1113 (2002) (identifying the
“plausible argument that the corporate form furnishes a competitive advantage in the market
for legislation” as a basis for discriminating against corporate political speech); Issacharoff
& Ortiz, supra note 235, at 1668 (suggesting that the corporate structure “makes the corporation a uniquely effective superagent,” thus presenting a basis for Austin’s distinction between
corporations and individuals).
237
Austin v. Mich. State Chamber of Commerce, 494 U.S. 652, 660 (1990) (noting that
“the unique state-conferred corporate structure that facilitates the amassing of large treasuries
warrants the limit on independent expenditures”).
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advertisements with “other people’s money,”238 or simply that corporations are not
proper participants in the democratic process.239 The consistent theme is that corporations are different, and different in ways that make people leery of their participation
in the democratic process, either because they are more likely to get what they want
from elected officials, because they wield disproportionate influence on voters, or because they are not people, citizens, or voters and behave differently than those actors
in a way that can be harmful to the democratic process.
Determining whether and how the state can regulate corporate speech will depend
on how and why that speech is protected in the first place. Numerous justifications
have been advanced for the robust protection of free speech, most prominently the
protection of individual autonomy and self-development, the value of free speech
for an unrestricted marketplace of ideas and the search for truth, and the information
needs of liberal democracy.240 As commentators have argued, autonomy or selfrealization interests are less compelling in the context of corporate speech than in
the context of individual speakers.241 The Supreme Court addressed this point in
First National Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, a 1978 decision rejecting state restrictions
on corporate advertising in referendum elections, indicating that a focus on the speech
rights of corporations presented “the wrong question.”242 The Court clarified: “The
238

See id. at 675 (Brennan, J., concurring); Winkler, Beyond Bellotti, supra note 149
(developing the “other people’s money” argument); Winkler, Other People’s Money, supra
note 149 (discussing the history of the “other people’s money” argument).
239
See, e.g., MUTCH, supra note 232, at 176 (noting that arguments against corporate
participation “must be understood in the context of another, deeper question—whether corporations as entities should participate in politics at all”); ROBERT B. REICH, SUPERCAPITALISM:
THE TRANSFORMATION OF BUSINESS, DEMOCRACY, AND EVERYDAY LIFE (2007) (arguing for
separation of capitalism and democracy, including added restrictions on corporate political
activity); C. Edwin Baker, Paternalism, Politics, and Citizen Freedom: The Commercial
Speech Quandary in Nike, 54 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 1161, 1174 (2004) (“The state concern
need not reflect an inherent objection to the content of any view—nor to an interest in
keeping people ignorant of any content. The reason for regulation is presumably a concern that
participation by this speaker distorts the (constitutionally protected and valued) dialogue.”);
Daniel J. H. Greenwood, Essential Speech: Why Corporate Speech Is Not Free, 83 IOWA L.
REV. 995, 1003 (1998) (arguing that the “picture of the corporation acting on behalf of a
fictional shareholder leads to the conclusion that corporations are defined by the law and the
market in a way that makes them inappropriate participants in the political debate”); Timothy
K. Kuhner, The Separation of Business and State, 95 CAL. L. REV. 2353 (2007) (arguing for
the separation of business and politics); Daniel R. Ortiz, The Unbearable Lightness of Being
McConnell, 3 ELECTION L.J. 299, 303 (2004) (arguing that the distinction between the treatment of individual speech and corporate speech “analogizes election spending more to voting
than to ordinary speech” and that “[n]atural people can participate in politics this way; nonnatural entities, like corporations and unions, cannot—and no one has a problem with that”).
240
See generally FREDERICK SCHAUER, FREE SPEECH: A PHILOSOPHICAL ENQUIRY (1982);
Kent Greenawalt, Free Speech Justifications, 89 COLUM. L. REV. 119 (1989).
241
See supra note 234 and accompanying text.
242
435 U.S. 765, 776 (1978).
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proper question therefore is not whether corporations ‘have’ First Amendment rights
and, if so, whether they are coextensive with those of natural persons. Instead, the
question must be whether [the challenged provision] abridges expression that the First
Amendment was meant to protect.”243 On this account, the protection of corporate
political speech is based on its value for listeners.244
This “the speech not the speaker”245 approach frames two important moves: first,
it concentrates the inquiry on the speech itself, asking if it is the kind of expression
protected by the First Amendment; and second, it reflects constitutional protection
of the deliberative environment rather than the speaker personally. Following this
approach, the express advocacy line provides a means of articulating which speech
the state can constitutionally regulate in protecting the deliberative process. In deemphasizing the speaker interest in the speech, this framing may allow for state regulation directed at protecting the deliberative environment, because a vision of the First
Amendment premised on the audience interest in hearing the speech is susceptible to
arguments predicated on an audience interest in being protected from the speech.246
While campaign finance cases involving individuals have also highlighted the structural elements of robust First Amendment protection, there is in those contexts a
personal right of the speaker, implicating participatory or dignitary interests, in the
balance as well.247 Here, that element is limited.248
Justice Scalia and Justice Kennedy challenge this account in their Austin dissents,
arguing that corporate political speech does implicate significant individual interests
in associational rights, as individuals join through the corporate form to advance interests, speech and otherwise.249 Both dissents quote Tocqueville on the importance
243

Id. The Court explicitly left open the question whether corporations have lesser First
Amendment rights than individuals. See id. at 777–78 & n.13.
244
Id. at 777 (“The inherent worth of the speech in terms of its capacity for informing the
public does not depend upon the identity of its source, whether corporation, association, union,
or individual.”); see also Red Lion Broad. Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 390 (1969) (“It is the
right of the viewers and listeners, not the right of the broadcasters, which is paramount.”).
245
See Greenwood, supra note 239, at 1003 (noting that Bellotti “explicitly rejects the
notion that a corporation might have different speech rights from a human speaker, and insists
that it is the speech, not the speaker, that determines constitutional protection”).
246
See Rebecca Tushnet, Power Without Responsibility: Intermediaries and the First
Amendment, 76 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 986, 986 (2008) (arguing that “[a]n audience-centered
theory of free speech . . . cannot accept that the First Amendment is satisfied by government
nonintervention into the market”).
247
See, e.g., Nixon v. Shrink Mo. Gov’t. PAC, 528 U.S. 377, 418, 420 (2000) (Thomas,
J., dissenting) (noting that “limiting contributions curtails individual participation” and that
“the right to free speech is a right held by each American, not by Americans en masse”).
248
See Dan-Cohen, supra note 234, at 1248 (noting that regulation of speech may be constitutional “when it targets corporations even though it would fail if individual speech was the
target” because individuals are “also protected by an original active right to self-expression”).
249
Likewise, Justice Scalia argues in McConnell that “[i]n the modern world, giving the
government power to exclude corporations from the political debate enables it effectively to
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of associations (including corporations) in American life and public debate,250 and
reject the argument that “these groups and their views are not of importance and value
to the self-fulfillment and self-expression of their members, and to the rich public dialogue that must be the mark of any free society.”251 However, there is reason to doubt
the strength of an association argument in this context. To the extent the argument
is premised on business corporations, there is no reason to believe that any investors
look to those corporations to represent their speech interests rather than simply to make
money.252 Further, if the argument focuses on ideological advocacy corporations,253
such groups may be constitutionally exempted from any regulation,254 and if they are,
it is likely because they are funded by for-profit corporations, the basic target of the
regulation. As a result, this right of association argument in free speech form adds
little to an argument premised on the audience’s right to hear the speech.
This dispute emerged as a tussle in the WRTL opinions over the “grassroots”
nature of the ads, as WRTL had self-dubbed its advocacy efforts.255 Justice Scalia
seized on this characterization, complaining that BCRA had “undermine[d] the traditional and important role of grassroots advocacy in American politics”256 and noting
the “wondrous irony” that while “wealthy individuals dominate political discourse,
it is this small, grass-roots organization of Wisconsin Right to Life that is muzzled.”257
muffle the voices that best represent the most significant segments of the economy and the
most passionately held social and political views.” McConnell v. FEC, 540 U.S. 93, 257–58
(2003) (Scalia, J., dissenting in part). Justice Kennedy there argues that corporations “are the
engines of our modern economy,” that “[t]hey facilitate complex operations on which the
Nation’s prosperity depends,” and that “[t]o say these entities cannot alert the public to pending
political issues that may threaten the country’s economic interests is unprecedented.” Id. at 340
(Kennedy, J., dissenting in part).
250
Austin v. Mich. Chamber of Commerce, 494 U.S. 652, 693–94 (1990) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (quoting 2 A. DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 109 (P. Bradley ed.,
Vintage Books 1948) (1840)); id. at 710–11 (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (quoting TOCQUEVILLE,
supra, at 106).
251
Id. at 710 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
252
See supra note 235 and accompanying text; see also Winkler, Beyond Bellotti, supra
note 149, at 199 (noting that “it is hardly clear that corporate political speech serves any selfrealization goals of the individuals who have chosen to associate with the corporate entity”).
253
See McConnell, 540 U.S. at 258 (Scalia, J., dissenting in part) (noting that “with increasing frequency, incorporation is chosen by those who associate to defend and promote particular ideas—such as the American Civil Liberties Union and the National Rifle Association,
parties to these cases”).
254
See supra note 89 and accompanying text.
255
See FEC v. Wis. Right to Life, Inc., 551 U.S. 449, 458 (2007) (describing what WRTL
calls its “grassroots lobbying campaign”).
256
Id. at 502–03 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment) (“If § 203
has had any cultural impact, it has been to undermine the traditional and important role of
grassroots advocacy in American politics by burdening the ‘budget-strapped nonprofit entities upon which many of our citizens rely for political commentary and advocacy.’” (quoting
McConnell, 540 U.S. at 340 (Kennedy, J., dissenting in part))).
257
Id. at 503–04.
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Justice Souter countered by emphasizing the “documented threats to electoral integrity obvious to any voter, posed by large sums of money from corporate or union
treasuries, with no redolence of ‘grassroots’ about them.”258 For Justice Scalia, then,
BCRA strikes not only at audience interests but at speaker interests as well, while for
Justice Souter, WRTL’s corporate status and corporate funding trumps any potential
speaker interest.259
Consistent with a “speech not the speaker” approach, the principal opinion emphasizes the general availability of political speech, affirming the proposition that
“‘[f]reedom of discussion, if it would fulfill its historic function in this nation, must
embrace all issues about which information is needed or appropriate to enable the
members of society to cope with the exigencies of their period.’”260 Viewing WRTL’s
ad as “grassroots” adds weight on the side of First Amendment protection; in avoiding
this characterization, the principal opinion relies on the distinction between issue advocacy and express advocacy, letting the content of the speech shape the permissibility
of regulation.
In specifying the use of express advocacy or its functional equivalent as the sole
valid regulatory line, the principal opinion limits the regulatory sphere to speech about
the election in a “commercial” sense, speech that solicits action by voters. We see
a similar distinction in the commercial speech context.261 The treatment of ads that
invite voters to support or oppose a candidate recalls commercial speech cases in
which the Court considered the level of First Amendment protection for speech that
“does ‘no more than propose a commercial transaction.’”262 Much as advertising is
a distinctive form of speech,263 we can read the WRTL principal opinion to indicate
258

Id. at 522 (Souter, J., dissenting).
Justice Souter points out that “[t]he bills for [the ads] were not paid by WRTL’s PAC,
but out of the general treasury with its substantial proportion of corporate contributions; in
fact, corporations earmarked more than $50,000 specifically to pay for the ads.” Id. at 523
(Souter, J., dissenting) (citation omitted).
260
Id. at 474 (majority opinion) (quoting Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88, 102 (1940));
see also id. (“Discussion of issues cannot be suppressed simply because the issues may also
be pertinent in an election.”).
261
Kathleen Sullivan draws a different analogy, comparing express advocacy to incitement:
“In Judge Hand’s view, only action verbs that were triggers to action were punishable, while
speech merely increasing the probability that one would become subversive was to be allowed.
Likewise, the lower courts have limited FEC discretion to determine what constitutes incitement to vote.” Sullivan, supra note 3, at 314 (citing Masses Publ’g Co. v. Patten, 244 F. 535,
537–43 (S.D.N.Y. 1917)).
262
Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748, 762
(1976) (quoting Pittsburgh Press Co. v. Pittsburgh Comm’n on Human Relations, 413 U.S.
376, 385 (1973)).
263
See Mitchell N. Berman, Commercial Speech and the Unconstitutional Conditions
Doctrine: A Second Look at “The Greater Includes the Lesser,” 55 VAND. L. REV. 693, 726
(2002) (noting that “[a]dvertising assumes a particular attitude towards the subject, one of
promotion or ‘advocacy’”).
259
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that speech that proposes a particular vote (even if it does more)264 receives different
constitutional protection than speech that educates and informs,265 an approach consistent with Bellotti’s emphasis on the type of speech at issue.266 This point recalls
arguments that what makes a speaker’s interest in commercial speech unworthy of
robust constitutional protection is that in proposing a commercial transaction and with
commercial gain as its primary motivation, the speaker forgoes First Amendment interests in its speech and advances speech protected by virtue of the audience’s interest
in hearing it.267 Analogously, the express solicitation of votes constitutes the corporate
speaker as a participant in the electoral process subject to regulation, rather than as an
educator or provider of information.
The “speech not the speaker” framing sets up the clash of the speech interests and
democracy interests in these cases as a clash of structural interests rather than of an individual right and a state interest.268 This framing presents the opposite of the clash
between rights and rights sometimes adopted in the voting context, for example in
Burson269 or some of the voter identification claims.270 Here, rather than characterizing the state interest in rights terms,271 WRTL frames the rights claim as a structural
264

See Daniel Halberstam, Commercial Speech, Professional Speech, and the Constitutional
Status of Social Institutions, 147 U. PA. L. REV. 771, 852–53 (1999) (explaining that the definition is underinclusive and would be more accurate if phrased as “all speech that proposes
a commercial transaction (whether or not it does more)”).
265
See supra text accompanying note 130.
266
See supra notes 242–245 and accompanying text.
267
See C. Edwin Baker, Realizing Self-Realization: Corporate Political Expenditures and
Redish’s The Value of Free Speech, 130 U. PA. L. REV. 646, 653 (1982) (arguing that “the
market mechanism, by forcing the enterprise to make the most efficient (profit-maximizing)
decisions, dictates the content of the enterprise’s speech, and thus separates the decision concerning speech content from the value decisions of either the employees or the owners of the
enterprise”); Robert Post, The Constitutional Status of Commercial Speech, 48 UCLA L. REV.
1, 12 (2000) (“Commercial speech, however, does not seem a likely candidate for inclusion
within public discourse, because we most naturally understand persons who are advertising
products for sale as seeking to advance their commercial interests rather than as participating
in the public life of the nation.”).
268
See Gerken, supra note 108, at 519–20 (noting Justice Breyer’s move to structural
framing in campaign finance context).
269
See supra note 156 and accompanying text.
270
Some courts have balanced the right to vote of voters without identification against the
right to vote of other voters who have an interest in not having their votes diluted by fraudulent
voters. See, for example, Purcell v. Gonzalez, 549 U.S. 1, 4 (2006) (quoting Reynolds v. Sims,
377 U.S. 533, 555 (1964)), for the proposition that “the right of suffrage can be denied by
a debasement or dilution of the weight of a citizen’s vote just as effectively as by wholly prohibiting the free exercise of the franchise.” But see Crawford v. Marion County Election Bd.,
553 U.S. 181, 128 S. Ct. 1610 (2008) (not relying on this framing).
271
Ronald Dworkin has urged this move in the campaign finance context. See Ronald
Dworkin, The Curse of American Politics, N.Y. REV. OF BOOKS, Oct. 17, 1996, at 19, 21–23
(arguing that the right to vote includes a subsidiary right of equal influence on the electoral
process).
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interest in which the significance of the speech is its value for democratic governance,
rather than the interest of the individual speaker.272 Under this clash of structural interests, the Court must identify the extent to which the First Amendment mandates a
hands-off approach to protecting speech in the democratic process, distinct from any
individual interest in speaking. Further, if the speech interest is not seen as absolute,
the Court must then determine whether the state interests in preventing undue influence on representatives and protecting public confidence in the democratic process
can outweigh the corresponding interest in unrestricted deliberation.
This structural framing shifts the focus of the analysis from speech and rights
to regulation of the political process—determining the sphere within which the state
can intervene.273 The use of an express advocacy line for regulation of political ads
reveals a model in which the state’s interest in regulating activity explicitly within
the election process is sufficiently weighty to justify the regulation of speech. Recognizing a role for the state in protecting representational integrity shifts this analysis,
giving the state an interest in this larger sphere just as it has in protecting the vote.
Ultimately, the question reduces to the role the government can play in the political
process beyond administering the ballot-casting process.
B. The Election Period Approach in the Corporate Advocacy Context
The interest in regulating corporate political advertisements can be understood
to stem from the way such ads insert themselves into the representative relationship.
Broadcast ads differ from influence secured through more direct mechanisms, such
as lobbying or campaign contributions, in their use of voters as a means by which to
secure influence, a tool that can be most effective in the election period, when voters
are both paying closer attention and can take direct action.274 On a representational
account, the concern is not about influence running from the advertisers to the public,
but about the extent to which the benefit thought to be conveyed by any such influence can yield access and favor from elected officials.275 While ideological advocacy
272

See ALEXANDER MEIKLEJOHN, FREE SPEECH AND ITS RELATION TO SELF-GOVERNMENT
22–27 (1948); Post, supra note 15, at 1841 (explaining that “the Meiklejohnian model focuses
on the capacity of citizens to receive and utilize information in deciding future action” and
contrasting this model with a “participatory model”).
273
The tension between individual rights and structural approaches is a longstanding one
in the election law field. See, e.g., Samuel Issacharoff & Richard H. Pildes, Politics as Markets:
Partisan Lockups of the Democratic Process, 50 STAN. L. REV. 643, 648 (1998) (arguing that
“courts should shift from the conventional first-order focus on rights and equality to a secondorder focus on the background markets in partisan control”); Gerken, supra note 108, at 504
(arguing that “[a]n individual-rights framework, however, does not provide adequate analytic
tools for resolving” claims about the structure of the political process); HASEN, supra note
150, at 135 (arguing against supporters of the “structural approach” and arguing courts should
only intervene in the political process to protect rights).
274
See supra notes 41–45 and accompanying text.
275
See supra note 198.
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corporations are often authentically seeking to sway public opinion on their issues,
the use of corporate funds and the corporate form can make such ads equally threatening, especially in light of the regular use of such organizations as conduits for
corporate funds.276
The concern that these ads harm public confidence in the democratic process,
deriving in its “appearance of corruption” form from Buckley, supports the focus on
representation as well.277 This public confidence argument is somewhat enigmatic;
we don’t limit speech for other public confidence ends, so it is not obvious why a concern for public confidence in democracy would justify any limitation on speech.278
Many reacted angrily when the Supreme Court invoked a seemingly analogous argument that the threat of voter fraud may cause voters to feel disenfranchised as a possible justification for voter identification laws,279 and there is little evidence that these
speech restrictions actually improve public confidence in the democratic process.280
The public confidence argument serves here as an analogue of the interest in
participatory self-government, addressing the ways reduced trust in government can
turn citizens away from the democratic activity necessary for the functioning of the
representative relationship.281 Much as contribution limits can be seen to “democratize the influence that money itself may bring to bear upon the electoral process,”282
the BCRA ad restrictions correspondingly sought to democratize public discourse and
its influence on representation by limiting the role of corporate actors in that realm.283
276

See, e.g., McConnell v. FEC, 540 U.S. 93, 128 (2003) (noting that “[b]ecause FECA’s
disclosure requirements did not apply to so-called issue ads, sponsors of such ads often used
misleading names to conceal their identity” and providing examples); id. at 197 (providing
examples of misleading names used by advertisers). Corporate funds were earmarked for the
WRTL ads. See supra note 259.
277
See supra note 196 and accompanying text.
278
See Nathaniel Persily & Kelli Lammie, Perceptions of Corruption and Campaign
Finance: When Public Opinion Determines Constitutional Law, 153 U. PA. L. REV. 119, 124
(2004) (noting the “extraordinary nature of the state’s interest in preventing appearances of
corruption in the context of First Amendment law”); see also McConnell, 540 U.S. at 329
(Kennedy, J., dissenting in part) (rejecting a perception-of-corruption rationale for restrictions
on political speech because “[t]his rationale has no limiting principle”).
279
See Purcell v. Gonzalez, 549 U.S. 1, 4 (2006) (“Voter fraud drives honest citizens out of
the democratic process and breeds distrust of our government. Voters who fear their legitimate
votes will be outweighed by fraudulent ones will feel disenfranchised.”); see also Spencer
Overton, Voter Identification, 105 MICH. L. REV. 631, 665 n.165 (collecting sources criticizing
this move in Purcell).
280
See Persily & Lammie, supra note 278, at 122–23.
281
See Post, supra note 17, at 1134–36 (noting that the public confidence argument “forces
us to confront the possibility that the achievement of democratic values may, in discrete circumstances, require carefully bounded structures of managerial control”).
282
Nixon v. Shrink Mo. Gov’t PAC, 528 U.S. 377, 401 (2000) (Breyer, J., concurring).
283
Cf. Joshua Green, The Amazing Money Machine, ATLANTIC MONTHLY, June 2008, at
52, 54 (listing “the effect of campaign-finance laws in broadening the number and types of
people who fund the political process” as one of the primary forces shaping then-Senator
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On this account, public disenchantment stemming from the “special access and guaranteed favor” that concentrated corporate and union wealth is perceived to receive
and from ads seen as bids for such influence threatens to discourage the individual
participation that is crucial for developing the dynamic interaction between representatives and the people upon which democratic legitimacy depends.284 This account bolsters the second side of the relationship between the public and the representative:
whereas the special access and undue influence secured by the funding of the ads can
make the representative less responsive to public opinion,285 the harm to public confidence created by the ads may threaten to inhibit participation in such a way as to
limit the dynamic interaction with representatives. A majority of the Justices have
taken such an argument seriously in the contributions and voter identification contexts,
despite the lack of reliable empirical support.286
From this perspective, we might read the public confidence framing as a means
by which the Court ratifies an expressive or aspirational move by the government
signaling a commitment to promoting effective representation. Given the existence
of threats to an effective representative process stemming from corporate bids for influence,287 the recognition of public confidence concerns reinforces campaign finance
Obama’s “ability to fully harness the excitement that his candidacy has created, in votes and
in dollars”).
284
Cf. STEPHEN ANSOLABEHERE & SHANTO IYENGAR, GOING NEGATIVE: HOW ATTACK
ADS SHRINK AND POLARIZE THE ELECTORATE (1995) (arguing that negative political advertising on television suppresses voter turnout and contributes to disillusionment about politics);
Richard R. Lau et al., The Effects of Negative Political Campaigns: A Meta-Analytic
Reassessment, 69 J. POL. 1176, 1184 (2007) (concluding that “[n]egative campaigning has
the potential to do damage to the political system itself, as it tends to reduce feelings of political
efficacy, trust in government, and perhaps even satisfaction with government itself” though
it does not appear to depress voter turnout).
285
Cf. McConnell v. FEC, 540 U.S. 93, 150 (2003) (noting that “[t]he evidence connects
soft money to manipulations of the legislative calendar, leading to Congress’ failure to enact,
among other things, generic drug legislation, tort reform, and tobacco legislation”).
286
See Crawford v. Marion County Election Bd., 553 U.S. 181, 128 S. Ct. 1610, 1620
(2008) (noting that “public confidence in the integrity of the electoral process has independent significance, because it encourages citizen participation in the democratic process”);
McConnell, 540 U.S. at 144 (“Take away Congress’ authority to regulate the appearance of
undue influence and ‘the cynical assumption that large donors call the tune could jeopardize
the willingness of voters to take part in democratic governance.’” (quoting Shrink Mo., 528
U.S. at 390)). Stephen Ansolabehere and Nathanial Persily call this argument into question in
the voter ID context as an empirical matter. See Stephen Ansolabehere & Nathaniel Persily,
Vote Fraud in the Eye of the Beholder: The Role of Public Opinion in the Challenge to Voter
Identification Requirements, 121 HARV. L. REV. 1737, 1760 (2008) (concluding that “[t]he
use of photo identification requirements bears little correlation to the public’s beliefs about
the incidence of fraud” and that “[t]he possible relation of such beliefs to participation appears
even more tenuous”); see also Persily & Lammie, supra note 278 (raising a similar challenge
to the use of the public confidence argument in the campaign finance context).
287
See Crawford, 128 S. Ct. at 1642 (Souter, J., dissenting) (arguing that “the force of the
[public confidence] interest depends on the facts (or plausibility of the assumptions) said to
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law’s goal of shaping a more participatory and more democratically responsive
representative process. As a result, though the undue influence argument has been
placed in a corruption box, largely due to Buckley,288 a better way to think about it is
as a failure of representation.289 A campaign finance scheme targeting such failures
presents an attempt to protect the practice of representative democracy against the
representational harms threatened by corporate influence.
The election period framing allows for calibration of the interest in effective representation. Much as attention to representation demonstrates that concerns about
certain forms of influence are not limited to the voting process itself, the election
period framing focuses regulation on the time when such concerns are most salient
while retaining a close connection to the election setting. Simultaneously, the structural framing of the speech-focused approach shapes an account emphasizing the deliberative environment, and calls attention to the broader structure of the democratic
process and the interests at stake on both sides of the election line. The combination
of concerns about corporate political influence and the governing framework of First
Amendment protection in this setting thus yields a context where regulation is constitutionally plausible. In turn, these meet with the democratic interest in protecting
the deliberative environment in the pre-election period as a formative moment in the
development of the representative relationship to shape the type of regulation for
which the election period approach is appropriate. The election period framework
does not do all the work; it is only once the speech in question may be subject to regulation that the concept can serve as a viable framework. While regulation of corporate political advocacy has not survived the Court’s consideration of Citizens United,
this analysis of that setting demonstrates the way the election period framework interacts with a structural protection of the democratic process and concerns about the
effectiveness and legitimacy of the representative process to present a fruitful model
of regulation.
CONCLUSION
The recent decision in Citizens United v. Federal Election Commission marks
a decisive shift in campaign finance law, striking down restrictions on corporate electoral advocacy.290 Though the full implications of Citizens United will emerge over
justify invoking it”); Shrink Mo., 528 U.S. at 395 (finding that “there is little reason to doubt
that sometimes large contributions will work actual corruption of our political system, and no
reason to question the existence of a corresponding suspicion among voters”).
288
See Landell v. Sorrell, 406 F.3d 159, 163–64 (2d Cir. 2005) (en banc) (Calabresi, J., concurring in denial of rehearing en banc) (noting that “[e]fforts to tailor all campaign finance
reform to corruption . . . surely have constrained possibilities for creative proposals that may
not fit comfortably into the proffered box”).
289
See URBINATI, supra note 17, at 226 (arguing that campaign finance reform can be
justified on the basis of preventing the undue influence of some private actors from creating
representational failures).
290
Citizens United v. FEC, No. 08-205, slip op. (U.S. Sup. Ct. Jan. 21, 2010).
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time, I offer some early thoughts on the decision in connection with the discussion
here. I suggest that the divide between Justice Kennedy’s opinion for the Court and
Justice Stevens’ dissent291 reflects a divide between an account of democracy focused
on the vote itself and a broader vision in which the government would have some
authority to promote self-government and protect the representative process. Ultimately, the debate over campaign finance in Citizens United stands in for a broader
debate about the democratic process and the role of the state, the same divide underlying the election period model discussed here.
In rejecting an anti-corruption rationale for the challenged restrictions, Justice
Kennedy emphasizes that “[i]ngratiation and access . . . are not corruption.”292 This
framing not only limits the model of corruption that can justify regulation293 (and
rejects McConnell on this point),294 but sketches a theory of representation as well.
Justice Kennedy previously advanced this account in his McConnell dissent, indicating that the threat of special access, which the McConnell majority accepted as a
basis for regulation, was not a harm at all, but a dynamic inherent in democratic representation.295 As he stated there (and repeated in Citizens United), “[i]t is well understood that a substantial and legitimate reason, if not the only reason, to cast a vote for,
or to make a contribution to, one candidate over another is that the candidate will
respond by producing those political outcomes the supporter favors.”296 In short,
“[d]emocracy is premised on responsiveness,”297 with the only regulable form of
“[b]ad responsiveness” being quid pro quo corruption, demonstrated by “a relationship
between an official and a quid.”298 This account of representation denies the state
a compelling interest in promoting a model of representation premised on ensuring
responsiveness to the public more generally and preventing undue influence stemming
from powerful interests.299
291

The dissent—technically, an opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part—is joined
by Justices Ginsburg, Breyer, and Sotomayor. Id.
292
Id. at 45.
293
See Heather K. Gerken, The Real Problem with Citizens United, AM. PROSPECT, Jan. 22,
2010, http://www.prospect.org/cs/articles?article=the_real_problem_with_citizens_united.
294
See supra notes 152–156 and accompanying text.
295
See McConnell v. FEC, 540 U.S. 93, 291–98 (2003) (Kennedy, J., dissenting); see also
Nixon v. Shrink Mo. Gov’t PAC, 528 U.S. 377, 409 (2003) (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (noting
that “[t]here are no easy answers” to the question “[w]hether our officeholders can discharge
their duties in a proper way when they are beholden to certain interests both for reelection
and for campaign support,” but concluding that “the Constitution relies on one: open, robust,
honest, unfettered speech that the voters can examine and assess in an ever-changing and more
complex environment”).
296
See Citizens United, No. 08-205, slip op. at 43–44 (quoting McConnell, 540 U.S. at
297 (Kennedy, J., dissenting)); see also id. at 43 (“The fact that speakers may have influence
over or access to elected officials does not mean that these officials are corrupt.”).
297
McConnell, 540 U.S. at 297 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
298
Id.
299
Justice Scalia, who joined this portion of Justice Kennedy’s McConnell dissent,
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Justice Kennedy signaled the limits of this responsiveness framework with his opinion for the Court in Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co., which read the Constitution’s
due process guarantee to require recusal where a judge receiving “extraordinary”
levels of campaign support in the form of independent expenditures300 considered a
case involving the supporter, creating a “serious, objective risk of actual bias.”301
While responsiveness is a virtue for representatives, it is not a virtue of judging; even
so, any harm must be prevented by regulating the elected official rather than the private speaker.302 The interplay of Caperton and Citizens United speaks to the tangle
of speech, democracy, and rule-of-law ideals animating the doctrine and highlights
the absence of concern about forms of legislative responsiveness short of the quid
pro quo relationship.303
This account of representation aligns with the model of free speech the Court draws
in Citizens United. Justice Kennedy emphasizes that “[t]he First Amendment confirms
the freedom to think for ourselves,”304 summing up a vision of the First Amendment
in which the primary value of corporate speech, notwithstanding the identification of
corporations as “associations of individuals,”305 is the information it provides voters.306
suggested a similar view in his own McConnell dissent. Id. at 259 (Scalia, J., dissenting)
(noting that “[i]t cannot be denied . . . that corporate (like noncorporate) allies will have greater
access to the officeholder, and that he will tend to favor the same causes as those who support him (which usually is why they supported him)” and that “[t]hat is the nature of politics—
if not indeed human nature—and how this can properly be considered ‘corruption’ (or ‘the
appearance of corruption’) with regard to corporate allies and not with regard to other allies
is beyond me”).
300
Justice Kennedy referred to such expenditures as “contributions,” thereby emphasizing
the assistance they provide to candidates. Caperton v. A. T. Massey Coal Co., 559 U.S. ___,
129 S. Ct. 2252, 2256, 2257, 2264–66 (2009).
301
Id. at 2265 (concluding that “there was here a serious, objective risk of actual bias that
required Justice Benjamin’s recusal”).
302
See Citizens United, No. 08-205, slip op. at 44–45 (“Caperton’s holding was limited
to the rule that the judge must be recused, not that the litigant’s political speech could be
banned.”); cf. Pamela S. Karlan, Electing Judges, Judging Elections, and the Lessons of
Caperton, 123 HARV. L. REV. 80, 101–02 (2009) (framing this as a structural protection of
electoral process).
303
See Citizens United, No. 08-205, slip op. at 68–70 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (discussing
Caperton and judicial elections).
304
Id. at 40; see also id. at 24 (“The Government may not by these means deprive the
public of the right and privilege to determine for itself what speech and speakers are worthy
of consideration.”); id. at 39 (“Factions should be checked by permitting them to all speak, and
by entrusting the people to judge what is true and what is false.” (internal citation omitted)).
305
Id. at 33, 38, 40 (referring to corporations as “associations of citizens”)
306
See id. at 25 (“[I]t is inherent in the nature of the political process that voters must be
free to obtain information from diverse sources in order to determine how to cast their votes.”);
id. at 38–39 (“By suppressing the speech of manifold corporations, both for-profit and nonprofit, the Government prevents their voices and viewpoints from reaching the public and
advising voters on which persons or entities are hostile to their interests.”).
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This freedom is a protection of the listener, limiting the government’s power “to
command where a person may get his or her information or what distrusted source
he or she may not hear.”307 The implication is that because Americans can think for
themselves, more information cannot hurt them,308 but can only help in the voting
process.309 Much as the Court emphasized the vote as a means of promoting proper
representation, it treats free speech largely as a tool for casting that vote. Together,
these approaches yield a role for the government in the democratic process largely
limited to administering the election itself.
In contrast, Justice Stevens is concerned about “the integrity of elected institutions.”310 He argues that “in a functioning democracy the public must have faith
that its representatives owe their positions to the people, not to the corporations with
the deepest pockets”311 and that “[i]n a democracy, officeholders should not make
public decisions with the aim of placating a financial benefactor.”312 The repeated “in
a democracy” language in these statements suggests that these views stem from an
underlying vision of what democracy demands.313 This account of proper representation and governmental integrity counsels a responsiveness to the people generally
rather than those who accrue heightened access or influence through financial support.
Likewise, the concern for the public’s “faith” emphasizes the state’s responsibility
to encourage democratic self-government. In recognizing here these state interests
that extend beyond the vote, Justice Stevens follows his (and Justice O’Connor’s)
opinion for the Court in McConnell and Justice Souter’s WRTL dissent.
The divide is thus clear. Because for the Citizens United majority the vote itself
serves as the means of policing representation, the government cannot enact any speech
restrictions that limit the ability to cast a fully informed vote. In contrast, the Citizens
United dissenters’ concerns about proper representation and democratic integrity allow
for at least some targeted regulation of election-related speech to promote representation and popular self-government. The question may ultimately reduce to how much
weight we believe the vote can carry as an instrument of democratic governance.
307

Id. at 40.
See id. at 45 (noting that “it is our law and our tradition that more speech, not less, is
the governing rule).
309
See supra note 227 (presenting sources challenging this model).
310
Citizens United, No. 08-205, slip op. at 4 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting
in part) (stating that “[t]he Court’s ruling threatens to undermine the integrity of elected institutions across the nation”). Recall Justice Souter’s emphasis on “integrity” in his WRTL dissent.
See supra notes 182–183 and accompanying text. Notice also Justice Kennedy’s subtle response to this point, emphasizing “the primary importance of speech itself to the integrity of
the election process.” Citizens United, No. 08-205, slip op. at 17.
311
Id. at 55 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
312
Id. at 59 n.63 (applying this view “except to the extent that the benefactor is seen as
representative of a larger constituency or its arguments are seen as especially persuasive”).
313
See also id. at 57 (arguing that the majority’s approach “disregards our constitutional
history and the fundamental demands of a democratic society”); id. at 63 (“A democracy cannot
function effectively when its constituent members believe laws are being bought and sold.”).
308

592

WILLIAM & MARY BILL OF RIGHTS JOURNAL

[Vol. 18:533

The treatment of the disclosure and disclaimer rules applicable to electioneering
communications under BCRA reflects this dynamic as well. In challenging these
requirements, Citizens United raised a question left open by the WRTL decision: if the
government cannot ban ads that are not the functional equivalent of express advocacy,
can any forms of regulation be premised on the election period? The Citizens United
Court disposed of this claim relatively easily, noting the previously recognized interests in “‘provid[ing] the electorate with information,’” and “‘insur[ing] that the
voters are fully informed’ about the person or the group who is speaking.”314 Further,
because “disclosure is a less restrictive alternative to more comprehensive regulations
of speech,”315 even after WRTL the requirements could constitutionally apply to electioneering communications and not express advocacy alone. The disclosure context
thus presents the intersection of the competing accounts, with the Justices in the
majority approving a regulation that increases the available quantum of information
for making electoral choices,316 and the dissenters approving a regulation designed to
protect the integrity of the democratic process as well, by enabling monitoring and
deterring corruption.317 On this account, disclosure requirements present the best of
both worlds.
While commentators have begun to debate ways in which regulation might be
more closely targeted at particular corporations, we should also consider how any
such regulation might be structured. To take one example, new limits on foreigncontrolled corporations are being proposed by Congress.318 Can such limits be based
on an electioneering communications framework, as the statute barring participation
by “foreign nationals” in the electoral process currently provides?319 The Citizens
United Court indicated that protecting against foreign influence in the political process could be a compelling government interest.320 The Court’s discussion may
314

Id. at 52–53 (quoting McConnell v. FEC, 540 U.S. 93, 196 (2003) and Buckley v. Valeo,
424 U.S. 1, 76 (1976)). This portion of the opinion was joined by all the Justices except
Justice Thomas.
315
Id. at 53.
316
Id. at 55 (concluding that disclosure and related transparency requirements “enable[ ]
the electorate to make informed decisions and give proper weight to different speakers and
message”).
317
See McConnell, 540 U.S. at 196 (agreeing that “the important state interests that
prompted the Buckley Court to uphold FECA’s disclosure requirements—providing the electorate with information, deterring actual corruption and avoiding any appearance thereof, and
gathering the data necessary to enforce more substantive electioneering restrictions— apply
in full to BCRA”).
318
See David D. Kirkpatrick, Democrats Try to Rebuild Campaign-Spending Barriers, N.Y.
TIMES, Feb. 12, 2010, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2010/02/12/us/politis/12citizens
.html (discussing proposed legislation).
319
See 2 U.S.C. § 441e(a)(1)(C) (2006).
320
See Citizens United, No. 08-205, slip op. at 46–47 (“We need not reach the question
whether the Government has a compelling interest in preventing foreign individuals or associations from influencing our Nation’s political process.”).
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leave open the possibility that, as in the contexts of judges or quid pro quo deals,
responsiveness to foreign nationals is a form of “bad responsiveness” in the representation process and may be limited on that basis, thus accommodating an electioneering communications framework. Again, an underlying account of what democracy
both demands and allows would be doing the work here. My goal is to identify and
assess that theory.
In calling attention to the varying accounts of democracy embedded in the judicial
approaches to campaign finance regulation, this paper counsels greater accommodation
of state protection of the representative process—and not only the vote itself—and
seeks to integrate campaign finance regulation into a larger account of the democratic
process. In this light, BCRA’s reshaping of election speech regulation through the
development of an election period provokes deeper questions underlying the goals,
forms, and legitimacy of regulating political activity in the election setting and interrogates our conception of the role of the state in regulating the democratic process.
Articulating a sharp distinction between politics and the vote is one way of striking a
balance, avoiding “chaos” in the voting process while leaving the deliberative environment free from government regulation. I advance the election period framework as
a model of continuity between politics and elections, seeking the best of representative
democracy, combining the democratic voice of the public and a properly representative
government in both periods.
Congress’s expansion of the electoral domain in BCRA might thus be read as a
tacit statement of democratic theory, emphasizing the broader inputs into democratic
legitimacy beyond the vote itself, while the WRTL principal opinion and the Citizens
United decision articulate and reinvigorate an opposing theory in which the vote is
sharply distinguished from a surrounding sphere of political deliberation into which
the state cannot enter. As a result, identifying the significance of the electoral setting
beyond the fact of ballot-casting is crucial in developing frameworks for state administration of the political process. As voting scholars consider administrative models
of election law,321 and as we enter a new era of thinking about campaign finance
regulation, we would do well to focus on the proper scope of state involvement in
structuring the operation of our democratic process.
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See Heather K. Gerken, A Third Way for the Voting Rights Act: Section 5 and the OptIn Approach, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 708, 746–48 (2006) (discussing utility of administrative
law paradigms in the right to vote context); Issacharoff, supra note 9, at 1458 (noting “that
some pressures toward an administrative law of elections are beginning to present themselves
here” in America).

